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    ABBREVIATIONS. 
 
 SSA= Sub Saharan Africa 
 SAP= Structural Adjustment Programs 
 PFCE= PRIVATE FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE. 
TMGS= TOTAL IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
GDP= GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
 
   DEFINITIONS OF SOME CONCEPTS. 
 
1) PROXY BASE OF A TAX: The term is use in this work to represent or 
approximate the specific selected imports on which the custom duty tax  (CTM)  and 
the domestic activities on which the sales/VAT (STV) are charged to, since is not 
easy to determine a legal base of tax  and also because in Cameroon not all 
consumptions and productive activities faced these component of indirect taxes. 
 
2) BUOYANCY AND ELASTICITY: Buoyancy measures the total response of tax 
revenue to changes in income incorporating the discretionary effects of a tax while 
elasticity the automatic or the built-in response of revenue to income changes 
excluding the discretionary tax impact. 
NB: In literature instead of the term ‘Buoyancy’ some author prefer the term 
‘Elasticity’ used with some suitable qualifying adjective (Mansfield 1972). 
The only difference between tax to income elasticity and buoyancy is the 
discretionary changes. 
 In this work I use the two terms sometime to mean the same measures given the 
difficulties to get the discretionary tax changes for Cameroon. 
 
 
NB: The author’s casual use of the words productivity in this work is not in relation 
to production efficiency but imply the sensitivity or the responsiveness of the tax 
revenue changes. 
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SUMMARY 
 As most developing countries strive to achieve Economic growth and development, it 
has been quite a challenging issue to attain a balance in their fiscal policy 
management. Most of these countries have faced a prolonged (persistence) budgetary 
deficit caused by the increasing growth in their public expenditures more than in their 
incomes. The most important puzzling question has been why is there a slow revenue 
mobilization in developing countries?  It was realized in the mid 1980s by the World 
Bank studies that this slow revenue growth has been due to their poor fiscal design 
policies. Hence according to the Ahwad and Stern (1991), SAP design for developing 
country’s tax reforms was accorded a top priority. Meanwhile Sohota (1961) earlier 
pointed out the role of tax reforms as one of the important and a major ingredient to 
economic development of a nation. 
Cameroon in Sub Saharan Africa faced this problem in mid of 1980s. The country 
was not only heated by a recession but faced a prolong budget deficit problem from 
1986-1994. Since 1990 two major tax reforms were implemented in 1994 and 1999 to 
restructured the country‘s tax policies for revenue mobilization in order to 
overshadow the deficit scenario. It is rather unfortunate that since the reform package 
were implemented; there has been little or no work done so far to assess the success or 
influence of the reforms on indirect tax revenue raising capability. It is this challenge 
or knowledge gap that I was motivated to cover in this piece of work. Due to the large 
scope of taxation, this issue of tax revenue mobilization is restricted only to the 
indirect tax reform in Cameroon.  The major pre-rogatives of this work involve; 
-An exposition of the indirect tax structure of Cameroon and the trends of tax revenue 
growth.  
-To investigate if the tax reforms did improve the initial tax revenue situation or rather 
helped to engineer the response of the tax system to changes in the tax bases for the 
purpose of raising sufficient revenue requirement for the economy. 
-To identify which indirect tax hurdles become more responsive (flexible) or remain 
rigid after the tax reform, as well as which of the indirect taxes responded to revenue 
increases depend on discretionary power influence than by natural response 
(elasticity). 
-Finally, what are the conceivable implications of the indirect tax outcomes to the tax 
policy makers of the country?   
 vii
Methodology:  I used the model of tax elasticity and buoyancy1, estimated from a tax 
function, an approach used by similar works in other developing countries by Prest 
1962; Sohota 1961; Lavin 1968; Mansfield 1972; Chellah 1971. The tax elasticity is 
the responsiveness of the tax revenue growth relative to the change in the tax bases 
excluding any external influence on the revenue growth such as the use of discretion, 
changes in tax rates and so on while Buoyancy is similar but involves measurement of 
total tax revenue that encompasses all other external influences. Within the indirect 
taxes, the sales/VAT taxes (STV) as the main consumption tax and Custom 
duty/imports (CTM) from international strand were utilized as samples for the 
analysis. The GDP used as the main tax base, with one proxy2 base (actual base) for 
each tax sample. The total imports of goods and services (TMGS) as the proxy base 
for custom duty tax and private final consumption expenditure (PFCE) for the 
expenditure taxes. Time series data on tax revenue from 1980 -2003 were used 
basically due to difficulties of getting tax revenue data in an extended period for 
Cameroon. Data on sales/VAT taxes and custom duty tax were obtained from 
Cameroon tax department of the ministry of finance and Central Bureau of National 
statistics while that on GDP, PFCE and TMGS, were obtained from World Bank 
Development Indicator. The data on discretionary tax revenue were not available at 
all in Cameroon. Thus, I finally adopted the Dummy variable techniques used by 
Singer (1968) to capture the effect of tax reforms and in estimating the tax elasticity 
of the indirect taxes in Cameroon. Hence from a given tax function,  a series of 
regressions were ran using the Eview and stata as the main statistical software 
package . 
RESULT: The overall results of the tax reforms on revenue mobilisation in 
Cameroon showed a progressive trend. The impact of the 1994 and 1999 tax reforms 
in regards to revenue raising tended to vary depending on the specific tax and the 
respective tax basis. The empirical finding of the impact of the 1994 tax reforms on 
STV showed a decline in the intercepts of 22% and 24.5% for GDP and PFCE 
                                                 
1  Buoyancy measures the total response of tax revenue to changes in income incorporating the 
discretionary effects of a tax while elasticity the automatic or the built-in response of revenue to 
income changes excluding the discretionary tax impact. 
 
2  Use to represent or approximate a specific selected base of given indirect tax. See page v for detail 
definition. 
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respectively. The long run effects of the elasticity response (slopes shifts) resulted to a 
positive increase in STV revenue of 0.039 and 0.311 from GDP and PFCE.  
 Similarly the CTM experienced a decline in the intercepts that resulted to a decrease 
in it tax revenue from the pre- reform level by 19% and 43% out of GDP and TMGS. 
The elasticity response shows an elastic increase in slope by 0.056, an indicated rise 
in CTM revenue by 5.6%. On the contrary, there was inelastic decline in slope of 0.54 
for TMGS. This  implies decrease in CTM revenue by 54%, which was only in the 
short run due to the reduction in tax rate intended to counter the effects of rising 
prices cause by devaluation of the country currency in1994. 
 In respect to the 1999 tax reform impact, the VAT showed a positive shift in the 
intercept of 10.35% and 3.43% in respect to GDP and PFCE as tax bases, with an 
insensitive response of slope (elasticity) alteration. 
 The interpretation of the stated empirical findings of this work are that a decline in 
intercepts signifies an autonomous lost (leakage) of tax revenues. On the other hand 
elasticity response due to changes in slope in a positive direction indicates an increase 
in revenue due to increase tax rate by reform and an inelastic response of a decline in 
the slope indicates falling tax revenue due to a cut in tax rate. One very interesting 
realisation of this slope interpretation is the opposite effects on the tax base, where the 
underline tax bases decline in the post 1994 tax reform except for TMGS due to a cut 
in CTM rate. 
A comparative analysis of the stated result of the difference indirect tax hurdles 
showed that CTM become more responsive to revenue yield than STV in the post 
1994 reform period. VAT remains rigid to revenue mobilisation after the 1999 tax 
reform. 
Other findings of the research from the analysis of elasticity and buoyancy with 
regards to the third objective indicated that before tax reforms in Cameroon; both 
indirect tax samples had an inelastic response to changes in their bases, while the post 
reforms, result of the STV became more responsive (elastic) and the customs duty 
remained inelastic. Again there were indications of dominant use of discretion in 
mobilising revenue than through in-built response of the elasticity. 
The final outcome of these results and it implications that warrant some policy 
intervention are the realised lost in revenue, inelastic response of the tax bases which 
threaten sustainability future tax revenue flow and the ultimate effects of 
 ix
unpredictable use of discretion in the country tax system. Few recommendations have 
been suggested in the light of improving the situation.
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                                                         CHAPTER 1 
 
1.0:  INTRODUCTION 
 The performance of the economies of most developing countries in the last few 
decades has been an issue of concern to the rest of the world. International monetary 
institutions responded to salvage the imbalances of most of these nations by designing 
the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) which was henceforth expected to be 
adopted and implemented by these poor nations. SAP is a set of macro economic 
adjustment policies. In most of the Less Developing Countries (LDC) due to their 
increasing budgetary pressure as a result of the rapid increase in expenditures to 
provide the basic necessity for the poor, and the limited scope to raise extra revenue, 
tax reforms have been accorded a top priority (Ahwad and Stern, 1991). 
        Cameroon’s economy had experienced a steady growth in economic performance 
since independence in 1960s. Economic Development and progress in Cameroon can 
be analyzed in three main phases (Johannes et al; 2006). The first phase marked from 
independence in 1960 to the mid 80s when economic recession (economic crises) set 
in. This phase was the period of an impressive and a remarkable progress in the 
economic performance. This came as a result of the spectacular yield in agricultural 
products, accompanied by a rise in their world market prices. Another contributing 
factor was the oil boom which came from the discovering and exploring of this 
natural resource and above all was the efficient management of the government in 
sustaining and consolidating the public fund through provision of the basic public 
good and services. Thus in 1984/85,Cameroon had one of the highest per capita 
income in the Sub Saharan African with a minimum average of FCFA 249,000 
(302.279 dollar) according to Amin, (1996) as reviewed (Johannes et al., 2006). But 
suddenly the country was plunged into a severe economic recession in 1987/88 (Amin, 
2002).  
This second phase of the Economic Development which was a reverse of the trend, 
known as the crisis period was from 1986/87 to 1993/94. It was quite deteriorating as 
there was a decline in almost all major economic activities. The country’s recorded 
negative investment rate of 8.6 percent (World Bank, 1992), fall in consumption, 
Government expenditure increasing against a decline in revenue, and above all 
deterioration in terms of trade. Such deterioration was attributed to the sudden fall in 
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the world’s market prices of oil, in unison to our major export crops which constitutes 
the main base of the country’s economy. The continuous down turn of the world’s 
market prices worsened country’s term of trade, as our expenditure on imports and 
their prices persistently remain stable or rather increase.  Within the economy over 
this period, the government faced a deficit in the budget, marked by an exceedingly 
higher expenditure over its income. Transaction with the rest of the world indicated a 
deficit in the country Balance of Payments (BOP), in addition to was the overall 
decline in the country GDP as illustrated on figure: 1 below.  
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FIGURE 1: CAMEROON GDP FROM 1980 TO 2005. 
SOURCE: BY THE AUTHOR 
 From the fig.1 is evidence that before 1986/87 the GDP of Cameroon was rising, and 
immediately took downward trends, which correspond to the recession period. During 
the recession period, debt burden of the country rises both external and internally. In 
the phase of population increase, the government attempt to meet up with the increase 
demand resulted to continuous increase in public expenditure. Consequently all 
foreign aid that came in could not salvage the situation of the crisis. 
All culminated to economic hardship, which as a consequence ignited Cameroon to 
appeal to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (IBRD) to 
assist in combating the crisis. Cameroon therefore had to join the lines of other 
developing nations, in implementing the band wagon of International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank SAP reforms. The SAP package consisted of macro 
economic reforms. Among some of its important policies were the trade and financial 
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liberalization, the reform of public sector, tax reforms on revenue raising and so on.   
In attempt to identify the sources of the downward trend of the Cameroon GDP, the 
poor respond of the tax revenue to the country GDP was an issue of concerned. A 
number of studies on taxation in developing countries, Cameroon in particular, 
indicate that Cameroon has witnessed a declining level of tax income. For instance, 
world bank (1994 tab A.2) indicates that, Cameroon tax revenue amounted to 12.3 
percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) compared to a median of 18.5 percent of 
Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) countries. Most reports have pointed out that Cameroon’s 
system for collecting and administering tax revenues were inefficient, ineffective and 
somehow inadequate.  Thus in consultation with the international monetary 
institutions, Cameroon had implemented a series of revisions on its taxation policies 
since 1990. 
 This began with the restructuring of the tax administration where the weak, 
disorganised and corrupt tax administration was reformed through organisation of 
external and central services in the government. This was followed by the 
establishment of tax payer registration, and the improvement in tax payer education 
and information, and the development of data processing capabilities to facilitate tax 
management. Then come was the full implementation of tax reforms in 1994 and the 
adoption and full implementation of the value added tax (VAT) in 1999. This issue of 
restructuring of tax system in Cameroon through the tax reform implementation 
constitutes the focused of this research work. 
1.2   STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 Since the implementation of the tax reforms in Cameroon, little or no efforts has been 
made to evaluate and assess the performance of the reforms in terms of revenue 
mobilisation capacity of the tax systems, coupled with the plausible consequences of 
the reforms on their respective tax sources. It is for these reasons that this thesis 
attempts to explore such knowledge gap in Cameroon’s context.  
1.3: OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 Generally, the objective of this is to examine the impact of the Cameroon’s tax 
reform, in the case of its capacity in revenue raising. Specifically, the study analyses 
the trend and the response of each indirect tax category due to the indirect tax reforms 
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in relation to the changes in the overall income (GDP) and proxy base of each 
individual tax hurdles. 
This study will thus attempt to address the following questions:  
¾ -What have been the pre-reform tax system and the causes of the 
declined in the country tax revenues before the reforms?  
¾ Did the reform improve the initial situation in Cameroon? 
¾ -Have the tax reforms enhanced efficiency and flexibility of the 
indirect tax system? If so, which components of indirect tax system 
have been more responsive to changes in revenue?  
¾ -What is the conceivable policy implication of the results  
. The research will basically apply the model of elasticity and buoyancy as used by 
Mansfield (1972) and as also recently used by Muriithi and Moyi (2003), Chipeta 
(1998). Considering that mobilising or raising of domestic revenue from taxes come 
from both the direct and indirect tax sources, constitutes a very extensive area of 
covering. The scope of this work is therefore limited more on the indirect tax reform. 
The study focuses more on indirect tax policies in analysing the impact of tax reforms 
in revenue mobilisation in Cameroon. This is because changes in consumptions tax 
like sales tax/ Value Added Tax (VAT) affect a vast majority of the population than 
income tax. This in most cases is due to their large share contribution to revenue than 
the direct taxes. For instance according to Fambon (2006) between 1992/3-2000/1, the 
share of indirect tax on non oil tax revenue was 33% compared to 25% from direct 
sources on average. Also indirect taxes are easy source of revenue than income taxes. 
Generally most government in developing countries either for political goal or fear of 
impact of direct taxation on investment level tends to concentrate more on indirect 
sources of revenues than on the direct sources. Cameroon tax reform in particular, 
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indicates more frequent alteration of  rates of indirect taxes than on the direct taxes 
especially income tax.  The common kind of indirect taxes sample in  Cameroon used 
in this study include; excise duties, imports (custom) duties and  sales (Turn over Tax) 
replaced by VAT in 1999. 
1.4: STUDY HYPOTHESES 
The research objectives will be addressed by testing the following hypothesis. 
¾ -tax reform did not change tax revenue trends in Cameroon after the  
implementation  
¾ -the main indirect tax components have an inelastic response to changes in the 
GDP as well as to their tax bases. 
¾ Tax revenue changes in Cameroon do not depend on discretionary changes.  
¾ Indirect tax reforms in Cameroon did not cause any distortion on the economic 
activities of the country in general. 
The remainder part of this work will be organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 will cover the fiscal evolution, in Cameroon, structures; follow by 
identifying and justifying their trends as sources of revenue mobilisation before tax 
reform in the country. Chapter 3 will consist of a review of literatures on the role of 
tax reforms in raising country revenue and the experiences of the indirect tax reforms 
of other countries in the mobilisation of domestic revenue. Chapter 4 will examine the 
actual indirect tax reforms in the country. Chapter 5 will deal with the framework of 
measurement and estimation of different tax elasticity and buoyancy3. Chapter 6 is the 
methodology and presentation of regression result. The analysis and discussion of the 
result are in Chapter 7 while chapter 8 carry the conclusion and recommendations. 
 
 
                                                 
3  See page v for defination 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 FISCAL EVOLUTION IN CAMEROON 
 It is an indisputable fact that the post independent tax system from the 60s was a 
continuation of an inherited colonial fiscal design. This was basically the direct and 
indirect tax system (Loeb, 1900).  Over the years the system had undergone changes 
and modifications based on the existing economic circumstances. However, it will 
also be worth noting that the tax system operated by Cameroon from independence 
right up to the reform period was also being determined by the treaty of Brazzaville 
signed in 1964 under the canopy of UDEAC (Central Africa Economic and Custom 
Union) member countries currently know as CEMAC (Central Africa Economic and 
Monetary Community) which Cameroon is a staunch member. Existing literature 
points to the fact that since independence in 1960s Cameroon tax system relied 
heavily on selective tax and exemptions to promote the country’s economic and 
industrial development (Fambon, 2006, and Gauthier et al.; 2000). This was 
accompanied with an investment code to attract foreign capital and to encourage 
import substitution industries. Cameroon like other member countries also instituted 
other special indirect taxes not covered by the treaty of Brazzaville tax harmonization 
agreement. A case in point is the domestic excise duties besides the oil taxes. The 
purpose was to raise more revenue and promote other economic activities through 
exemptions.  Gauthier et al., (2000) however explains that the reason for this excise 
duty and other additional taxes was nothing more than promoting a complex and 
unfair tax and duties system in SSA. 
The following section intends to review the different tax structure that existed before 
the reform and analyze the fiscal operation up to the reform period. 
2.1: PRE-REFORM TAX STRUCTURE IN CAMEROON 
Generally Cameroon tax policy operates concordantly with trade and commercial 
policy. The country’s tax system is categorize into direct and indirect taxes 
A) DIRECT TAXES 
      With respect to direct tax they were several existed numerous forms of direct taxes:  
1) Income tax-was base on those with fixed income like salary earners. There was 
no particular modality specified on how this tax was to be collected especially 
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from employees with private contracts. However income taxes take a progressive 
system in proportion to the tax payer’s income. 
2) Pool  tax of 3000FCFA per person which was imposed on self- employed 
citizens, It was not easy to identify those classified as self employed by the tax 
collectors and most cases they had to force people to pay the tax through road 
block. The situation was worst in the rural areas where most of supposed tax 
payers were. Some of eligible tax payer often spent weeks in the forest when the 
tax collector arrive their area of jurisdiction to claim this tax revenue for the state 
(Fjeldstad and ranker, 2003). 
3) Corporation tax-were taxes on profit of firms and companies known as Impot 
sur le Benefites industrials et Commerciaux (IBC). It was quite a complicated tax 
that attracts the highest taxable amount depending on jurisdiction status and age 
of the business. In Cameroon businesses were expected to pay three category of 
this tax. 
     -Profit tax of 35% for incorporated business and 22% for unincorporated. 
Businesses also pay a 10% communal tax in addition. 
   -Minimum lump sum tax of 1% 0n turnover known as impot minimum de 
Perception (IMP) or Impot minimum forfaitaire (IMF) .This tax amount to 
600,000FCFA, or approximately 1.1% of turn over.  
  Businesses in the first 2 Years of operation were exempted from such tax .While 
they paid half of the normal rate in the next proceeding 2years. 
- There was also capital tax on firms ranging from 0.5-1.5% tax on dividends. Home 
citizen were charged 16.5% while non residents with mobile capital paid 25 % as tax. 
4) Patente: Business entrepreneur paid an annual business tax’ commonly known as 
patente, which was collected to support local government expenditure’s  criteria 
used to determine  such license was based on  the business output, equipments 
and on the number of employees. 
5) Other direct taxes were paid on corporate charter, duties on properties leases. etc. 
 Indirect taxes which contribute more than 50% of non oil revenue consist of the 
following components before the tax reform in the country: i) import duties 2) export 
duties, 3) sales taxes (consumption tax) on domestic goods and services, and 4) 
specific taxes based on consumption of oil product. Three of these taxes were in 
agreement of the common external tariff of UDEAC. The domestic turn over taxes 
were also binding to the agreement but only that Cameroon has the pre-rogative of 
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determining it rate which she used as a relief to certain enterprises. Prior to the tax 
reforms in Cameroon in 1994, those institutions that were not exempted to benefits 
from UDEAC and Cameroon’s special program of the selective and exemptions tax 
design system were subjected to the following indirect taxes. 
B):  INDIRECT TAXES 
As regard to indirect taxes which is the focused of this study include basically the 
domestic turn over tax (sales taxes) as the main consumption tax and the taxes on 
foreign trade. Based on the research works of Fambon (2006), Gauthier and Gersovitz 
(1993) and Gauthier et al;(2000), the common indirect taxes  in Cameroon were as  
follow. 
 Impot sur le Chiffre d’Afaires Interieur (ICAI) known as Domestic turn over tax 
in English. This form of indirect tax system applied to trading firm existing in all 
UDEAC member countries. In Cameroon it is levied at 9 percent of sales value but 
reduce to 4.5 percent in certain cases and a special rate of 2.25% was applied to 
bakeries. This is explicitly, a form of consumption tax. 
Producer engaged in foreign trade were subject to the different indirect trade taxes 
obligations with lot of  diversified rate, ranging from 0-500% (World Bank, 1995) 
before the reform of the tax system in Cameroon  Those producers who imported 
intermediate goods were charged with four different tariff (i) Custom duties rate from 
5-50 % irrespective of the source. (ii) Import duties at the rate between 5-90 % 
regardless of the source, though some goods were exempted. (iii) Import turn-over tax 
at 10% on the value of both custom duties and import duties. Note also that foreign 
trade on consumption goods pay a tariff of 50%, raw material was 15% and primary 
goods was tax at 5%. 
There was also import surcharge levied at ad-valorem rate of 0 – 100 %. Import 
were also charge with taxes including communal tax, national council tax of carriers, 
veterinary tax, special fuel tax etc. 
The above taxes are today categorized under the following main indirect taxes in 
Cameroon. 
 
2.3:  MAIN COMPONENTS OF INDIRECT TAXES IN CAMEROON 
1) VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT): 
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This form of indirect tax imposed on value added at each stage of production 
process was instituted in Cameroon as a quasi4 value added tax in combination 
with the Turn-Over-Tax (TOT), to replaced the sales tax during the 1994 tax 
reform. The full implementation of the VAT to replace the TOT in January 1999 
was one of the most important tax reforms in the country. VAT is an indirect tax 
which rules has been accepted and reinforced since 1980 at international level 
with SAP and trade liberalisation. This is because from theoretical perspective is 
most likely, to minimize excess tax burdens. Given that the input VAT is reclaim, 
indicating a non taxation of intermediate goods and non differentiation of inputs 
taxes, an ideas initially propagated by Diamond Mirrlees Hindriks and 
Myles,(2005). Added to VAT is most prefer due to it allocative efficiency and 
higher yield prospects than other indirect taxes.   
VAT will be commonly applied to the following activities in Cameroon: 
production, services, distribution, construction works and real estate agencies. The 
VAT applied in Cameroon is at a uniform rate of 18.7% which include communal 
surtaxes and a zero rate. The adoption of a single rate of VAT has been justified in 
technical term as a necessary way of overcoming the administrative difficulties in 
countries with weak tax administration. This is not only going to help in 
facilitating the administrative management but will also help to reduce tax evasion. 
Generally an application of VAT as a single rate from theoretical view is an 
optimum solution in term of pareto efficiency when base on certain assumptions. 
It may also be to ease the organisation and collection of the taxes from the 
administrative point of view, curtailing evasion as well as avoiding discrimination 
against people preferences (Ahmad and Stern, 1991; Tanzi and Zee, 2000). 
Applying VAT at multiple rates may increase costs of administration and 
supervision.  
In Cameroon, most inputs in agricultural  are exempted from VAT, as well as 
certain sensitive products in area of health, such as single used syringes and 
packaging of medications and some basic necessities, medical drugs and health  
are all exempted from VAT 
 
 
                                                 
4 Quasi means firms pay taxes on their purchases and later request tax return from the government. 
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2 ) EXCISE DUTIES. 
This is form of indirect tax is applied in Cameroon in combination with VAT at the 
fixed rate of 25%. The intent of such tax is for revenue raising, but more in a 
discriminatory fashion or rather to correct the distortion created by the other tax 
system. They are basically subjected to products categories like tobacco, alcoholic 
beverages, perfumes and colognes, cosmetic and made–up products, hair lotions, 
precious stone and metal and jewellery. 
3) CUSTOM DUTIES OR IMPORTS TAXES 
   This is one of the important strand of external taxes used today more for revenue 
raising than for protectionism in most developing countries. With respect to 
Cameroon, where the government used to relied on a wide range of selective and 
exemptions schemes to encourage the country industrial development. The country 
overall tariff structure was highly diversified, with rates ranging from 0-500% (World 
Bank, 1995). However Cameroon customs taxes went through significant changes 
during the reform periods which were geared to the restrictions of exemption schemes, 
encouraging exports, reforming the tariff structure and in strengthening the 
administration of the customs duties. The UDEAC tax and customs reforms 
implemented in Cameroon  from January 1994 started with the dismantling of the 
existing system through the enhancement of the important  domestic taxes while 
reducing tariff on external trade, the reforms includes:. 
-The replacement of the former four applicable tariff type by a simple unified system 
known as the Common External Tariff (CET) applied to countries outside the 
CEMAC region.  
-The previous diversified imports duties system with rates ranging from 0 to 500% 
were reduced to 5%– 30% , with imports classified into four categories as follow: 
30% for consumption goods, 20% intermediates goods, 10% machinery / raw material 
and 5% for primary goods. 
- A Generalised preferential tariff was introduced on trade between UDEAC with an 
initial rates fixed at 20% of the CET. 
- Due to the fragile nature of the industrial environment in the CEMAC region each 
state has the right to place an extra temporary protection surcharge of the more than 
30% with excise goods and on some luxury imported goods. 
As remarked customs reforms in Cameroon were not only to fulfil the SAP of IMF 
and regional integration formalities but intended to increase revenue to finance budget 
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deficit. The country revenue had been declining due to the numerous exemptions 
scheme, evasion and a fall in oil exports. Based on the customs reforms firm that 
enjoyed special programs face a rate increase of 15.8% to 19.8% from 1992/3 to 
1994/5 with the privileges eliminated. The rate increased from 18.5% to an average of 
30% for firm under the free trade zone and with an ad-hoc arrangement. For those 
under the normal regimes had their custom rates falling from 66.6% in 1992/93 to an 
average of 20.3% in 1994/5. This was somehow an indication that the tariffs reforms 
tended to level the playing field (Gauthier et al, 2000) 
 Customs reform in Cameroon was also intended to encourage exports capacity of the 
country. This was done by placing export duty /VAT free on direct and indirect 
imports of raw material used in production of export goods. Other exports support 
programme like the free trade zone created to encourage firms or business 
establishment producing goods mainly for export.  
2.4:  THE EVOLUTION OF INDIRECT TAX REVENUE IN CAMEROON 
BEFORE TAX REFORMS 
 Before proceeding to review the trends of tax revenues collection (indirect tax 
revenues) in Cameroon, is better to have a look of the pattern of flow of some of the 
major economic indicators of the country before the tax reforms. Table: 1 below 
through some highlights on some of the major economics indicators from 1985-1992. 
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Table.1  
SOME OF THE MAIN ECONOMIC INDICTORS IN (%) AND AS SHARES OF 
GDP-CAMEROON   FROM 1985- 92. 
-----------------------------------------------                                                
        Prelim.  Projections 
key indicators.                               1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990     1991 1992 
 GROWTH RATES                                   
GDP                                                7.6       8.0     -6.5   -7.7     -3.3     -2.4   -1.0   1.7                                   
GDP/capita                                     4.3       4.6      -0.9    -10.6   -6.4    -5.6 -3.9 -1.4 
Private consumpt/capita                6.2        5.5       5.2      -2.5    -22.7   -5.3  -2.7 -1.3 
 Exports  GNFS Vol                     11.4    -25.6    -33.6    -9.0     15.0    5.1   1.5  -0.4   
 Imports  GNFS Vol.                     18.3      6.2   -13.4       -16.2  -10.5   4.5   -2.5 -3.1 
BUDGET SHARES TO GDP 
Government Rev/GDP                  20.9 21.5    18.1     16.0     16.0 13.7  16.7   17.8 
GOV.Expenditure/GDP                 22.5 22.0    31.0     22.0     20.0   21    21        21 
Budget deficit (-) or surplus (+)     -1.5    -1.2     -12.8 -.01        -4.0   -7.0   -4.6 -2.9 
 BOP SHARES TO GDP 
Exports/GDP                                  34.3    23.6     16.8   16.5   19.7     21.2 36.1 34.1      
Imports/GDP                                   23.3     22.9     21.2   19.2   17.8    19.1 22.0  22.2 
Current Account/GDP                   -4.0     -5.6       -9.8  -7.2      18.3   -2.5   -2.7    -4.9 
Real Effect EXCH. RATE (1980=100) 
Terms of trade (1980=100) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SOURCE: World Bank, (1992) Regional Corporation for Adjustment, (UDEAC) 
report.   
 
 The first part of the table show the growth rates of the GDP, GDP/capita, private 
consumptions which growth rates tremendously fall to negative value after 1987, The 
private consumption per capita drop from 5.2% in 1987 to -22.7 in 1989,-5.3 in 1990 
and to -1.3 % in 1992. The drop in 1989 of 22.7 is very high; this was certainly due 
the political tension in the country, with operation ghost town that affected 
consumption to such an extent. Similarly, the GDP per capita which initially increases 
from 4.3% to 4.6% between 1985 and 1986, start experiencing a negative rates of 
growth after 1987 to -1.4% in 1992. This perhaps may be due to the rapid increase of 
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the country population, and the rising prices on the basic goods and services at during 
this period.   This is a palpable indication of the magnitude of the recession 
experience by the country over this period. The fluctuation in the growth rate of the 
GDP per capita and that of private consumption will have certainly lower the general 
consumption of goods and services. This will equally have effect on the tax revenues 
worth collecting. In respect to the budget ,government revenues as a percentage of 
GDP decline from 1985 to 1990,from 20.9% to 13.7%.this was probably due to poor 
performance of the general economic activities which affected the tax revenue yield 
severely, couple with a lot of embezzlement of public fund, existence of numerous 
exemption schemes for potential tax payer. Evasion by citizen to comply with their 
tax obligation can not also be excluded from the cause. While the continuous increase 
in demand of services from the growing population and the government desire to avert 
the economic from the crisis culminated to the increasing government expenditure, 
the overall consequent is the deficit on the budget as indicated on the table 1 above. 
The next table, table 2 below shows the country total revenue and expenditures in 
billion of FCFA from 1982-1996. 
TABLE 2: REVENUES, EXPENDITURE AND DEFICIT IN CAMEROON:1982-
1996 
YEARS REVENUES EXPENDITURES SURPLUS 
 IN BILLION FCFA IN BILLION FCFA IN BILLION FCFA 
1980    
1981    
1982 413831.6 412429.9 1401.7 
1983 497927 494231 3696 
1984 650438.5 648944.6 1493.9 
1985 753696.2 751015.6 2674.6 
1986 873910.1 876590.8 -26086.5 
1987 833583.7 858598.3 -25014.5 
1988 593469.8 630336.9 -36867.2 
1989 545446.9 551433.7 -5986.7 
1990 465612.5 488820.8 -23208.3 
1991 480852.8 501244.9 -20392.2 
1992 562926.5 571864.1 -8938.6 
1993 471380 487052 -15671 
1994 408674 451283 -42609 
1995 536537 526614 9922 
1996 693111 638424 54687 
SOURCE:  DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLES. 
YAOUNDÉ. COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR. 
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 Table: 2. shows that, since 1986 Cameroon total expenditure exceeded the income. 
This resulted to a budget deficit, which persisted up to 1994. After 1994 when there 
were tax reforms specifically on indirect taxes the country deficit tends to a surplus 
which was ascribed by the present regimes as the years of hope (Johannes et al 2006). 
Though the deficit faced by the country occurred during a period of economic 
recession.  Though many factors were responsible to the underscore economics 
situation, the low and negative income from taxation was the main cause of the budget 
deficit (Amin 2002).  Tax revenue is a major source of income in the country. The 
decline in tax income in Cameroon during the economic crisis period that resulted to 
budget deficit as review on the table above constitutes a major challenge to the nation. 
Why was tax revenue declining in Cameroon? Did the tax reforms put in place in1994 
and 1999 help to salvage the country from this initial situation? This study attempts to 
investigate this problem by assessing the productivity of the country tax system, 
limiting the scope of the analysis to indirect taxes in particular. 
 
 2.5) TREND OF INDIRECT TAX REVENUES IN CAMEROON BEFORE 
REFORM 
Generally, a close examination of tax revenues collection in Cameroon specifically 
indirect taxes review a very interesting trend, which seem to follow the overall trends 
of the country’s economic performance. Below are graphs which illustrate the pattern 
of the revenues collections from some of the major indirect tax components in the 
country 
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FIGURE: 2: IMPORTS AND SALES TAX REVENUES FROM 1982-1995 
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 FIGURE 3: REVENUE FROM EXCISE DUTIES FROM 1982-1995. 
 
 The graphs above show the changes on revenue mobilization of the major indirect tax 
components which include custom or import duties tax revenues (CTM) and the sales 
tax revenue from 1982-1994 shown on figures 2 and the Excise duties revenue (EXD) 
on figure 3. It is evidence from the graph that revenue from the mentioned indirect tax 
sources fluctuates regularly during the pre- reforms period. What then constitutes 
some of the major weaknesses responsible for the observe fluctuation on the country’s 
tax revenue mobilization? 
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2.6: REASONS FOR DECLINE OF TAX REVENUE IN CAMEROON PRIOR 
TO TAX REFORMS. 
 Cameroon like many other developing countries tax revenue mobilization tends to be 
procyclical (Talvi and Vegh, 2005). That is increasing during expansion and 
contracting in recession. What then are some of the prominent loopholes that 
characterized the down trends of Cameroon tax system prior to the institution of tax 
reforms in the country in 1994 and in 1999?  
1) TAX EXEMPTION:  The existence of numerous tax exemption schemes in 
Cameroon has been one of the major justifications of the decline in the country’s tax 
revenue before the implementation of it tax reform in 1994. For instance the World 
Bank (1992), remark on the widespread use of exemptions in developing countries 
indicated that it has eroded their tax bases more than the negative real GDP growth 
rates and lower commodity prices more than expected. An average of about 71 
percent was wholly /partly exempted in UDEAC (currently CEMAC) member 
countries. In Cameroon, between 1987/88 to 1990/91, over 62% of the country 
imports were exempted from import duties (World Bank, 1992). Some of the common 
exemption tax schemes that give special treatment from the tax authorities to producer, 
which resulted to greater loss of tax revenue in Cameroon include: 
a) Tax Unique (TU).Initially put in place to encourage industrialization and trade 
between UDEAC countries (Gauthier et al., 2000). Firms with TU status had a 
number of advantages in that you have preferential access to all other UDEAC 
member countries. They were equally exempted from paying the domestic turn over 
tax (ICAI). TU rate may vary and are negotiable depending upon the country to which 
producer products’ were to be exported. To obtain a TU status, firms had to apply to 
the management committee of the UDEAC secretariat. 
b)Tax Interieure a` la Production (TIP). It was a special regime that provides sales 
tax and tariff advantages in contrast to TU, but grant no preferential access to UDEAC 
markets. The benefits and rates were negotiated with the Cameroon ministry of 
finance rather than with UDEAC. 
c) INVESTMENT CODE (IC): Major tax exemptions and reduction are found in the 
IC. The IC has 5 schemes which benefit those firms that are capable of fulfilling the 
IC formalities. The said schemes include: The basic regime, small and medium size 
enterprises, the strategic enterprise regime, the re-investment regime and the free trade 
regime. IC regime benefit were not negotiable, however TU/TIP and IC regime are 
 17
mutually inclusive, allowing a possibility of benefiting from both scheme 
simultaneously. 
c) FREE TRADE ZONE (FTZ): Were inscribed in the 1990 IC, but covered by 
different law and administered by a separate organization. Firms in the FTZ benefits 
from full exemptions from international and indirect taxes but pay a very negligible 
fraction of their profit as tax. To enter the FTZ the firm total export must constitutes at 
least 80% and it activities has to be eligible to the basic IC.  
d) CONVENTION SPECIALE (CS): Firms without any special schemes suitable to 
their own specific needs negotiate directly with the ministry of finance for a special 
agreement. The only short coming of this scheme is that no guide lines existed for 
benefit and exemptions under such schemes. Hence firm in theory and in practice 
obtained full exemption from all tax obligations including the patente, for it life time 
operation. This unusual tax schemes was generally reserved for public or very large 
enterprises. 
    Exemption was further extended to include domestic indirect tax, which tax bases 
fall within the investment code.  To encourage home industries importer of raw 
material and capital inputs had up to 40% tax exemptions. Hence tax bases were 
widely limited, where the few tax payers had to shoulder all burden of subsequent tax 
increase to reduce the country budget deficit. This resulted to extensive tax fraud and 
evasion as the burden become heavy on the few taxable bases. 
 However, it should be noted that mere existence of exemptions schemes may not 
necessary lead to a decline in tax revenue of a country unless is prolong and 
sustainable. As remarked by the World Bank (1992), except those like the TU which 
entry was granted by defunct UDEAC secretariat? Most home officials and 
organization in charge of selecting goods or activities that benefit from the 
exemptions schemes were corrupt, thereby permitting a wider number of in-eligible 
activities into the schemes which cause a big drop in the country tax revenue. 
2):  TAX FRAUD AND EVASION: 
The exactitude of evasion is not easy to be determined, but the trend was on a rise 
in most CEMAC member countries. In Cameroon over two years 1986/87-1988)/90 
the countries domestic sales tax fell by 65 percent due to de-fiscalisation (World Bank, 
1992). However, in Cameroon according to Gauthier and Gervovitz (1993), those 
businesses that neither pay a group of taxes nor report an exemption are evaders. 
Their survey result of 197 businesses indicated that 96 were tax evader of all the three 
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businesses used in their definition. They notice that patente was the least evaded with 
only 14 cases, 68 evaded the business taxes while 82 evaded the sales taxes, but 
acknowledge that the actual amount of evasion was likely higher than their suggested 
calculation.  
Tax evasion or tax fraud takes many diverse forms which can not all be 
exhaustively analyzed noted (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). In most developing 
nations and Cameroon in particularly with high record of corruption, tax fraud and 
evasion was conspicuously high. Generally this may take the form of understating 
sales, as in the case of sales or the turnover tax, avoiding registering purchase of 
goods with tax, omission of self produce or deliveries from taxation, illegal 
importation of goods, and above all bribes offer to the tax official, which goes to 
accelerate the fraud and evasion of tax payment. The decline of tax revenue in 
Cameroon can not only be attributed to exploration of the different fraudulent 
mechanism but entirely on the weaknesses of the tax administration and  the existing 
of the large informal sectors. 
3) TAX ADMINISTRATION: Since the mid 80s it has been a recognized fact that 
improvement in tax administration is a necessary ingredient for a success of tax 
reforms (World Bank, 1991). This normally results to improve efficiency in the 
process of which taxes are assess, process and collected. The inefficient poor 
organized tax administration is certainly one of the major causes of the decline in the 
country tax revenues in mid 80s and early 1990s. The Cameroon tax administration 
has been under the function of two departments of the ministry of finance: 
 i) The tax department responsible for all domestic taxes. The duties of the tax 
department include tax assessment, collection, enforcement, drafting of tax laws and 
research.  It has 12 provincial bureaus and 110 tax offices across the country and all 
function within the frame work of the general tax code (Cameroon tax code 1994). 
Generally tax revenue collection has been poor under the tax department because they 
had no tax payer identification number, poor auditing system, improper harmonization 
of penalties, dates for filling returns and paying, no center for guidance and assistance 
to the potential tax payer. 
ii) The customs department: was responsible for all international trade taxes 
commonly known as Cameroon custom and governed by custom law. The custom 
offices are located at major ports, airports, railway station and at international borders. 
The main office for the custom department is in Douala, where the main port of the 
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country that serves three other African countries (Chad, Equatorial Guinea and 
Central African Republic) is located. The inefficiency of this department made 
clearance and export procedure very complicated, there was absent of proper 
monitoring of trade transit between Cameroon and neighboring countries. 
Thus Cameroon has since independence maintain these form of tax administration, 
despite other countries renovation through adoption and implementation of 
autonomous tax authority in managing their tax affair till 1994 when some adjustment 
were effected  on this domain of tax administration. The weak tax administration in 
the country has constitutes one of the major cause for the declining revenue in the 
territory.                   
4) EXISTENCE OF A LARGE INFORMAL SECTOR: 
 The informal sector has been on a rapid growth in many developing countries.  
Schneider (2002) estimated it to cover about 41% of GDP in developing countries.  
Keen (2007) coined it as a set of businesses and individuals that are less than full tax 
compliant. In Cameroon the informal sector constitutes a huge part of the economy 
and has been expanding due to the tax system as well as other administrative 
complications. The existence of a large part of the country’s economy out of the tax 
system do not only result to distortion on resource allocation but more on the lost of 
revenue. Cameroon tax revenue has been on a decline as a result of the dominance 
growth of the informal sector. The revenue decline is likely going to accelerate under 
the VAT system which is more a formal sector tax as analyzed by Keen (2007) paper 
on VAT attack. However Keen further recommended the VAT as an appropriate tax 
system that can capture the activities of the informal sector, given that those in the 
informal sector buy inputs from the formal sector, but cannot receive input VAT 
claims. The end result of this study may be able to tell the extent to which VAT had 
been able to overcome this drawback of the informal sector in respect to revenue 
mobilization. 
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CHAPTER 3 
                                        REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
  3.1:   REVENUE MOBILIZATION: 
 One of the most prominent objectives of almost all government is to achieve a 
satisfactory level of growth. Growth and expansion of economic activities dose not go 
without increase in expenditure by both the private and public sector. This will be 
more glaring observe in developing countries. Wherein there is a great need of such 
revenue to; carter for their growing population needs, need of more capital to increase 
investment, expand their general industrial sectors, improve general infrastructures on 
health and on Education. This concept of revenue mobilization in it simple 
understanding means the raising of revenue at both the micro and macro level to 
foster growth and development.  In short the tendency for a nation to raise revenue to 
meet up with it increasing public expenditure. 
. However, this may have a different connotation when used in reference to tax 
reforms. In most developing countries when used in connection to tax reforms, it 
implies the ways of making tax policies (system) more responsive to changes in 
national income (or proxy bases), in order to generate more revenue to mitigate the 
perpetual fiscal imbalances within an economy (Muriithi, 2003 and Chipeta, 1998). 
Ayoki et al., 2005 used the ideas of revenue mobilization to buttress, fundamental 
policy questions that exist the avenues for fast and lagging revenue growth for a 
country, focusing on tax reforms and macroeconomic issues. In general the use of 
revenue mobilization in connection to tax reforms is to assess the productivity2 of 
given tax structures (Prest, 1962 and Ariyo, 1997). Further analysis had also help in 
distinguishing which proportion revenue growth is within and without the power of 
the state (Mansfield, 1972).  The methodology used in analysis of tax reforms in 
relation to revenue mobilization has been the computation of tax elasticity and 
buoyancy over time.   
   
3.2: TAX REFORM STRUCTURE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Generally raising of revenue through taxation to adjust the budgetary imbalances 
faced by most less developing countries (LDC) during the crisis of the mid 80s has 
been a complex situation. The challenge to this domain arose from the tax 
administration, few tax payers due to non compliance by the tax payers, limited base 
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as a result of numerous exemptions, disincentives effects as well political 
complexities. This resulted to a situation where most state revenue mobilization fall 
short of the required expenditure. Hence there was a need for an urgent restructuring 
and reform of the tax structure in most of developing nations confronted with 
persistence budget deficit (Ahmad and Stern, 1991; Fjeldstad and Rakner, 2003).This 
chapter intend to briefly highlights the elements of tax reforms in developing 
countries, with more emphasis on the role of tax reforms, specifically the reforms of 
indirect tax structure in mobilizing revenue in developing countries. 
 3.3: ELEMENTS OF TAX REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 Musgrave (1987) pointed out that tax reforms in developing countries should consist 
of broad economic policies that should give adequate attention to the tax structure 
design and administration without necessary satisfying it revenues objectives. 
Though revenue target is important, the reforms must take into consideration the 
minimum level of taxation that each nation can attain. Tax reforms should serve as a 
means to restore buoyancy to revenues, strengthened modern taxes and reduce the 
complexities as well as improving the transparency of the system (World Bank, 
1990). In general tax policies adopted by Africa countries are almost same like those 
advocated by the developed countries, though having different economic and cultural 
background. Developing countries had tended to modify their tax system in same 
direction like those earlier adopted by developed countries irrespective of their 
economic and cultural background. The advocated tax policies include: 
-The introduction of the Value added tax. 
-Simplification of tax band and broadening of tax bases. 
-Lowering of personal and corporate income tax. 
-Reduction of imports duties and simplication of the rate structure. 
-Abolition of exports duties. 
-Simplication of excise duties structure  
- Restructuring of the tax administration. 
 The pattern of the tax reforms in developing countries, of reducing trade taxes and 
implementation of VAT to enhance domestic revenue mobilization are in concordance 
to the IMF and the World Bank conditionalities of SAP and stabilization programs. 
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3.4: ROLE OF TAX REFORMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
An improve analysis of tax reforms according to Ahmad and Stern,(1991) will 
depends on it efficiency in revenue raising ,the distributional impact on welfare and 
the incentive of the tax system in relation to economic activities. In meeting up with 
these objectives economic theory play a central role in designing the tax structure. It 
indicate a benchmark of simple model, from which policy implication can be deduced 
and finally provide method of collecting and analysis data. This study is concerned 
more with the raising of revenue through taxation and in assessing the sustainability 
of the tax system in future generation of revenue for development. 
  According to the standard theory of taxation, revenue can be raised in two ways. 
First by directly taxing the households through a lump-sum taxation (direct tax) and 
by indirectly taxing the transaction between producers and consumers (indirect tax). 
Though taxes are categorized into direct and indirect, there is no proper tax analysis 
that can be done independently (Almad and Stern, 1991). This idea only holds to a 
very limited extent in respect to revenue mobilization. Raising revenue from direct 
sources as income tax will have very little implication of raising it from the indirect 
sources. In this light a number of studies on the analysis of tax reforms in raising 
revenue in most countries had sighted indirect taxes as the dominant income source 
than from direct sources. The study of Pakistan tax reform revenue analysis indicated 
that close to about 80% of the country’s total revenue is from the indirect taxes where 
half of the revenue comes from the customs duties (Almad and Stern, 1991). A similar 
analysis of tax reforms in Central Africa Monetary and Economic Community 
(CEMAC) member countries to which Cameroon is member indicated a range of 60 
to 80% of non oil revenue receipts come from indirect taxes. The importance of 
indirect taxes or consumption taxes as a main tool of revenue mobilization need not 
be over emphasized, because they are not unpopular to the political regime in raising 
revenue as direct taxes can be. Most government in developing countries tends to 
meet up with their increased public expenditure through imposing of new indirect 
taxes or by modification of the existing indirect tax rates. In this light the assessment 
of tax reforms in generating income and productivity of the tax system in LDC and 
Cameroon in particular is focused more on indirect taxes. Priority is accorded to 
indirect taxes not only because they constitute an importance and a stable source of 
revenue but also as taxes in which theory are more better developed. 
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However due to the fast pace of trade liberalization, in LDC important of indirect 
taxes in generating revenue is declining (Tanzi, 1994). The raison d’etre being the 
insignificant share of indirect tax revenue contributions, based on elimination of 
exports duty and a reduction of import duties (conceptually ad- valorem tax) which 
have a disincentive effect to production. The liberalization of trade barrier to increase 
capital mobility in the world will pose a threat to LDC due to their limited tax 
administration capabilities, over reliance on foreign trade taxes.  Another important 
area of challenge to LDC is in the domain of tax competition. Tanzi and Zee, (2000) 
had therefore advice the LDCs to refrain from tax incentive which tend to discourage 
investments. Thus there is a great need for policy makers in LDC to implement 
reforms which are not only difficult but necessary in enhancing investments activities.  
The general trend of tax reforms in developing countries has therefore being that of 
facilitating trade liberalization through a reduction in trade taxes and a proper 
enhancement or reforms of the domestic taxes. Ghana experienced an increase in tax 
revenue of 11% in 1983 to 19% in 1989 after the implementation of tax reforms, in 
spite the reduction in her trade taxes by 12%, a fall in her trade term and export base 
(Addison and Osei, 2001). The study concluded that the revenue mobilized in Ghana 
can be sustainable if such revenue is used to finance pro-poor needs and to set up 
transparent fiscal institutions. To guarantee continue revenue rising, the legislature 
was mandated to check the executive until the countries budgetary process become 
more transparent (ibid). 
 The tax reforms implemented in Cameroon yet to be analyzed in next chapter were 
in line to those in other developing countries. A number of literatures used the 
optimum tax theory to explore and analyze whose taxes/bases should be utilized in tax 
reforms and how to design and set the appropriate tax rates in a tax system without 
undermining the technology and resource constraint (second best). The optimum tax 
theory is a sought of a given rate of a tax at which a given amount of government 
revenue can be raise, with minimum distortion in an economy. In order to achieves 
social efficiency through a desire adequate income distribution or an improvement of 
welfare. This work is not gear at determining such optimal tax design for Cameroon 
but simply to assess if  tax reforms facilitate  or retard  the productivity of  a given tax 
structure in order to fast achieve it optimal tax raising .   
Given challenges with difficulties in determining tax revenue, in relation to 
development and in mobilizing revenue in general. There had therefore been an 
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upsurge of interest by researchers in determining the yield or productivity of the 
country’s tax system. This is in order to assist the tax authority to know the response 
of the tax revenue to changes in income and when to seek for additional revenue 
through the use of discretionary measures. A sort of assessment had been done in 
many countries by employing the concepts of tax elasticity and buoyancy. It remains 
one of the main objectives of this study using the Cameroon tax system as a case of 
reference. This will be properly examined in the methodology section of chapter six, 
before proceeding to this there is need to have a review of the tax reforms in 
Cameroon, which is the object of the next chapter 
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CHAPTER 4 
TAX REFORMS IN CAMEROON 
This chapter intends to outline the objectives of implementing tax reform in 
Cameroon and to examine the specific tax reforms on the main indirect tax 
components or hurdles by the country since 1990. Then Follow by examination of 
some distortions of the indirect taxes reforms discussed on the economy. While the 
proceeding chapter will do with the measurement (assessment) of the tax reforms in 
raising revenues, and the discussion of the general changes of the country tax revenue 
as a consequent of the reforms. 
4.1 OBJECTIVES AND FRAME WORK OF PROPOSED REFORMS 
The priority aim of tax reforms in most developing countries today appeared to be 
more in conformity with domestic revenue mobilization rather than as a tool of 
management. As earlier noted Cameroon like all other CEMAC member countries 
objectives of tax reforms is entirely define by the regional conventions on their fiscal 
harmonization policy, which work in agreement to SAP conditionality. The specific 
effort of each country is limited only to improvement in tax administration and in 
reducing exemptions. The Regional Reform Program (RGP) made a number of 
flexible recommendations, for fiscal reform harmonization in the sub region which 
objectives were as follows. 
- to improve the revenue generating capacity of member countries, through a cut in 
nominal tariff rate and by reducing the plethora of the existing exemptions.  
- Improve on the efficiency and the competitiveness of the domestic 
manufacturing activity with a uniform spread of the burden across sectors and 
firms. 
- Regional instruments tariff and indirect tax were made more flexible so that the 
diverse need of member countries could be obtain rationally. 
-  Recommendations further call for simplification of the tax for transparency and 
easy administration. 
These recommendations were inadequate as the tax structure needed, with more 
flexible agreement in the sub region. Base on such recommendations, the specific 
objectives of Cameroon tax reforms implementation were as follow; 
According to Gauthier et al 2000; and Fambon 2006,the 1994 tax reforms in 
Cameroon were not only aimed at fulfilling the IMF/World Bank SAP 
conditionality’s and promoting regional integration of CEMAC (Central Africa 
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Monetary and Economic Community)  member countries but had as it overall 
objectives to;  
(1) Mobilize domestic resources by improving the yield of tax revenue.  
(2) Increase the important of domestic taxes and reduced tariffs by eliminating anti-
trade                                            biases. 
(3)Minimize the inequality and distortions of the existing tax system. 
(4) Eliminate tax evasion through harmonization of tax regime and general tax 
reduction. 
While 
The 1998, tax reform which involved the replacement of the sales tax (turn-over tax) 
with VAT was the most important reform of the tax system in Cameroon. It 
justification as based on economic principle was on revenue raising ability, base 
broadening with hope of involving the informal activities, and on the neutrality of the 
system. 
 
4.2 THE SPECIFIC INDIRECT TAX STRUCTURE AND THE REFORMS 
As noted, Cameroon’s tax structure consists of the direct and indirect taxes. This 
structure of tax system in Cameroon was examined in the pre tax system in chapter 
two.  This section is basically concerned with identification of the main indirect tax 
reforms, and the subsequent modifications of the main components of the indirect tax 
system in the phase of the reforms. 
      Indirect tax reform in Cameroon just like in any other developing countries have 
follow a common consensus of a reduction in trade taxes and enhancing domestic 
revenue collection through implementation of VAT as remarked by Stiglitz and 
Emran (2000)  
With respect to the trade reforms, CEMAC used this strand of reform to harmonise 
and to reduce inequality of the tax system in the sub region. Moreover the exemptions, 
evasions and fall in exports price of oil had eroded the revenue of member state 
enormously. Consequently in 1994 a resolution was passed by defunct UDEAC in 
complement to the SAP of the IMF and World Bank to reform tax system of the 
region specifically the indirect tax and tariff structure of the region. 
The devaluation of the FCFA in 1994, which resorted to doubling of input prices on 
imports, precipitated such reforms in Cameroon. The said trade reforms will be 
examined under the different aspects of the tax system.  
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A): REFORMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE TAXES. 
   The bases of most of these taxes were widened through reduction of exemption of 
most international transactions.  It should be worth remarking here that Cameroon 
reforms custom or international activities take account to the country adhesion to 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the regional integration of CEMAC. The 
CEMAC Act No 5/94 which fixes a common external tariff (CET) for non member 
countries also regulates the country imports and export duties as well, Cameroon tax 
code (1994) Custom taxes in Cameroon are levied on CIF value on imported goods, 
that taxing goods based on their origin principle, like taxing base on the price of the 
goods in the country where they are produce and include the cost insurance freight to 
Cameroon main port at Douala.  The taxes are imposed either on ad-valorem or 
specific rates.  The ad-valorem rate is used when the mode of the tax base is the 
quantity and is specific when the tax is assessed based on value of the exchange of the 
commodity in question. Generally goods with higher tax base elasticity yield larger 
revenue than those with low tax elasticity. Some of the changes on the country’s main 
taxes include. 
 
1) IMPORT TAX REFORMS 
-The former practice of four applicable tariff system was replaced by simplified 
unified system known as ‘’the Common External Tariff’’ (CET) applied to imports 
from NON CEMAC member countries. These imports were classified into four 
categories with tariff rate ranging from 5-30 percent as compared 0-500 percent in 
the previous system. Those of 5% applied on goods of basic necessity like 
medications, books, medical equipment, and agricultural inputs, 10% was on raw 
materials, industrial equipments, chemical products, industrial machines and cars, 
textiles, industrial spare parts, and other intermediaries were charge at 20% and 
finally 30% on consumption goods, home products and all other products. 
- All privileges related to foreign trade under investment code and special 
production exemption schemes like tax unit (TU), tax interieure a la production 
(TIP) and the convention of establishment described earlier in chapter 2 were all 
eliminated. 
- A generalised preferential tariff was introduced on trade between defunct 
UDEAC nations with CET fixed initially at 20%. 
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- The due consideration by CEMAC regulation of the difference  fragile  nature of 
the industrial environment in  member states, where Cameroon like any other 
member state was  granted  the right to set an additional protection  of a 
temporary  surcharge of  not more than 30%   on foreign trade (World 
Bank,1992). These were to be imposed in the form of excise duties on certain 
consumption goods, especially foreign imported luxury items or those produce 
locally under foreign license. This was regarded as a way of promoting a 
complex and unfair tax and duties system in the SSA (Gauthier et al., 2000). 
- Other tax reforms on imports include an inspection fees of 0.95% levied on 
imports at CIF and fees on computer of 1.55 values on import. 
- Finally imported goods were also subjected to a quasi value added tax , at 3 
difference rates, at zero rate were those completely exempted, at normal rate 
which faced an increase from 12.5% to 15% on January 1st 1995 to 17% in 1996 
and lastly were those import on lesser rate  originally fixed at 5% but increase to 
8%. 
 
2): EXPORT TAX REFORMS. 
-Taxes on exports were imposed on FOB value and include export base like timber 
levied at 17.5%, 3% to  4 % on logs content of process foreign products, added to 
was a progressive surtax levied on timber export exceeding 30% of total production. 
- Agricultural export attracted an inspection fees of 0.95 on FOB value and port fee 
levied at a rate of 0.25% on fob value of all exports. 
 
B): DOMESTIC INDIRECT TAX REFORMS 
The domestic indirect taxes that were intended in simplify the structure, broadening of 
the tax base by reducing exemptions and streamlining rates, alongside eliminating 
distortions of incentive framework include. 
 Elimination of privileges on indirect taxes under special production 
regimes and investment code, except in the industrial free zone. 
 The replacement of sales tax or production taxes (TU,TIP) by the Turn 
Over Tax (T0T),Quasi VAT applicable to domestic production ,imported 
inputs and intermediary productions classified under three categories: 
-Normal rate which rate was increased from 12.5% to 15% in January 1995 
to 17% in 1996. 
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-Lesser rate initially fixed at 5% was increased to 8% in January 1995 
(Cameroon tax code, 1995) 
The laying down of mechanism for levying excise taxes on certain product. This was 
clearly specified and fixed at a rate of 25%. Applicable to some of the following 
special categories of goods, like tobacco products, alcoholic beverages, perfumes and 
colognes cosmetic and made up products, hair lotions, precious stones, metal, 
jewellery and so on. The reform applied to similar products when imported. 
The 1994 tax reforms in Cameroon became effective in Feb.1994,but those firms 
under special regimes were granted some few months of transition after this periods. 
However the implementation of TOT in 1994 tax reforms never yielded any fruit in 
all directions like from revenue collection, manufacturing enterprises and exporters in 
Cameroon. Base on the poor performance of the TOT,  the government within it 
medium term policy programme supported by the international financial community 
focused the country’s tax reform more at improving  efficiency of the  tax 
administration and full implementation of the  VAT. This happened on the first of 
January 1999, which constitutes the most importance tax reform in Cameroon. 
 
1): VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT) REFORM. 
VAT was implemented in Cameroon in 1998 and took effect form 1st of January 1999.  
It was one of the major tax reforms in the country, where the sales tax or the Turn 
over Tax (TOT) instituted by 1994 reforms and the quasi value added tax were fully 
replaced by VAT.  The legislation raises and fixed it at a uniform rate of 18.7% which 
include communal surtaxes and a zero rate. VAT is commonly applied to the 
following activities in Cameroon: production, services, distribution, construction 
works and real estate agencies at the uniform rate of 18.7%. Zero rates which imply 
the goods are entirely free from paying VAT is by law applicable to all export 
activities in the country. However the Cameroon finance law of 1999 implementing 
VAT place all agricultural inputs (like insecticides, fertilizers and their other packages) 
to be fully exempted from VAT. The VAT exemptions categories were further 
extended to involve some sensitive products and necessities like in areas of health, 
such as single use syringes and packaging of medications, as well as medical drugs. 
Though Cameroon adoption and implementation of VAT at a uniform rate, like many 
other developing countries, is justified as a possibility of overcoming weak tax 
administrative problem and evasions as acknowledge by Tanzi and Zee (2000); 
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Shome (1999) and Cornely, (1995). The country main priorities were to generate 
more revenue for development, broadening of the tax base, and to benefit from the 
efficiency of the VAT. Whether these objectives of VAT reform have been fulfilled 
remains the object of the next chapter. 
 C):    TAX ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM. 
-Hence the following changes were effected in regard to the tax administrations: 
- The organisation of external and internal services within the government. 
- The establishment of taxpayer registration system; and  
- Improvement in the taxpayer education and information, and the development of 
data processing capabilities to facilitate tax management. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MEASUREMENTS AND ESTIMATION 
A series of tax reforms has taken place in Cameroon, after the economic crisis of 
1987/8 and devaluation of franc CFA in 1994.The objective of these reforms were to 
mitigate some regular fiscal imbalances in the economy. The country’s therefore 
required a revenue structure that is flexible enough to ensure greater revenue without 
constantly resorting to discretionary policy or inflationary financing in fostering the 
country’s economic growth and development. Consequently, Cameroon needs a 
flexible tax structure that the revenue yield should respond faster than the national 
income, so as to cover up expenditure growth. This requires that all individual taxes 
be designed so that yield is responsive to national income changes and the 
predominant taxes in the tax structure are of elastic yield to their proxy bases of GDP 
income. A flexible tax system will also be more effective in stabilizing an economy 
during booms and slumps than a rigid tax structure (Muriithi and Moyi, 2003). This 
form of information is lacking in respect to Cameroon’s tax system. 
Thus one of the objectives of this study is to assess the response of the country’s tax 
system, due to the tax reform, particularly the indirect tax structure which has been 
the focus of the country’s tax reform. This analysis will be extended by reviewing 
some of the specific effects of the tax reforms to the economy. The most common 
criteria used in assessing the yield of tax systems in developing countries has been the 
analysis of response of the tax revenue to changes in income (Prest, 1962; Sohota, 
1961; Lavin, 1968; Mansfield, 1972 and Chellah, 1971 ). This has often been done by 
applying the concepts of tax elasticity and buoyancy (Sohota, 1961; Mansfield, 1972). 
This work adopt the concept of elasticity and buoyancy to asses the tax yield in 
Cameroon, our reference paper being the work of Mansfield 1972, which was recently 
adopted and used by Chipeta (1998) for Malawi; Murrithi and Moyi (2003) for  
Kenya and Ariyo (1998) for Nigeria. Tax elasticity measure the automatic response of 
revenue to income changes while buoyancy is concerned with the discretionary or the 
total response of tax revenue to changes in income. 
However, for simplicity and data limitation, this work limits its assessment only to 
few main indirect taxes like import duty and sales/VAT tax for Cameroon. This 
analysis will be capable to expand our knowledge on the responsiveness of these main 
indirect taxes and hopefully shed light on their equity and efficiency Amin (2000) as 
asserted by Murrithi and Moyi (2003) research work. 
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Lavin (1968) emphasized the relevant of a tax base for each potential tax in evaluating 
a tax system. Hence according to Mansfield (1972) the elasticity of tax revenue is split 
into “tax to base” and “base to income”. The determination of such results will help us 
to identify which components of our indirect taxes under study are flexible or rigid. 
Those with elastic yield are more predominant in the system and also tell whose 
components of the tax growth in revenue are based on discretion or policy 
manipulation. Generally, the tax to base elasticity is within the control of the authority, 
though its ability maybe discredited by macro changes at times,  while base to income 
is an automatically inbuilt and not within the control of the authority. 
Mansfield 1972 symbolically summarizes tax revenue elasticity as follows: 
Where elasticity of tax to income ………………….. ……..        
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Where the elasticity of total tax (indirect tax) revenue to income is defined as        
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NB in equilibrium 
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Kkt TTTT ++++= ......1     Where =tT Total indirect tax consisting of k different 
individual taxes in the economy. k= 1,2….K 
T k  =revenue from indirect kth tax 
Y =income (GDP) or total final consumption income when applied to expenditures 
taxes. 
B k  = base of tax k 
   Δ   =changes operator. 
Generally, the income elasticity of k tax is the product of the elasticity relative to base 
and elasticity of base to income. This can be stated algebraically as  
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For a system of n-indirect taxes, the elasticity of the total indirect tax in the systems 
will be given by product of the tax to base elasticity and base to income elasticity for 
each separate indirect tax, weighted by the significant of the respective tax in the tax 
system stated as follow 
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K=1,…,n 
From the above decomposition, of tax elasticity into two components, the elasticity of 
the said taxes under consideration can be estimated or computed as follows 
 
 
 
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
Estimating the elasticity of indirect tax as demonstrated above for each indirect tax 
components can be computed using the model 
                      
εα βYT = ……………………………………………………………….. (6) 
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Where T=indirect tax revenue total   
Y =tax base (GDP) 
α  &β= parameters worth estimating,ε = error term or stochastic variable 
 
Taking the log we obtain the log linear specification as follows 
Log T = log α  +βlogY + logε  ……………………………………………………(7)  
in standard form it is reduced to;  
Log T= α +βlogY + Vt……………………………………………….…………...(8) 
α= constant, β=elasticity estimate to the tax to base, that is obtain by regression, 
reviewing to us how a 1% change in income (base) result to a given percent change in 
tax receipt revenue. 
Vt =stochastic disturbance terms 
Vt = log T - βlogY –α   ……………………………………………..………......(9) 
 
However, to estimate the elasticity of indirect tax to income, which has been 
undergoing some discretionary changes such as change in tax base rates, imposing of 
new taxes, abolition of some taxes and efficiency of tax administration, required some 
form of adjustment. This adjustment called for isolating the data on discretionary 
changes based on data provided by governments department several methods exist in 
doing so. 
Prest (1962) techniques involved cleaning the data on discretionary revenue changes 
using official data on discretionary revenue. Chipeta adopted this approach which is 
similar to proportional adjustment method used by Muriithi and Moyi (2003) adopted 
from Mansfield (1972), presented in a simple form by applying the following step; 
 
First by computing 
ijT =Tt –Dt  
Where 
Tt = actual tax yield in the t-year,  
Dt =budget estimate of the discretionary changes in the t-year 
Where t=1…n 
Tij = the actual tax collection of the j-year’s adjusted to the tax structure of that 
existed in year i. 
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This proportional adjusted method needs revenue yield for each year in the sample 
period to be adjusted to the revenue generated base on the structure of a reference year 
or base year 
Hence if i=1 is the reference year, then the series T11, T12, T13…..T1t……T1n is tax 
receipts if the tax structure is not alter in year 1, added to elimination of discretionary 
changes from year 1. This then constitute the series in measuring the elasticity of a tax. 
 Buoyancy of these sets of indirect taxes with respect to their bases (GDP) is derived 
from same regression of the model of logarithm but with unadjusted revenue data. 
Thus  
 
Log Tt = Bo + β1 log (Bt) +ε t  …………………………………..(10) 
 
Where β1 is the buoyancy ratio and Bt  is the base at given time. 
 The above describes method basic problems could be attributed to the difficulties 
of obtaining data on the direct receipts revenue, as well as that on discretionary 
changes, it also assumes that discretionary changes are progressive which might likely 
not be the case and lastly, the method is too aggregative than other approaches which 
decompose the elements of productivity measurement thereby providing a better 
insight into how each component affects the other over response of the tax system. 
An alternative approach is isolating discretionary impact of tax system is dummy 
variable technique (DVT) developed by Singer (1968), where dummy variable are 
inserted into the equation each year in which an exogenous tax policy occurred. The 
model is as follows; 
Log T =α +logy + εα +∑i iD1 ……………………………………….(11) 
 
Where Di (i = 1,0) represent a dummy variable that takes value of 1 for each year in 
which there is an exogenous change in tax policy and a value zero (0) otherwise. 
Where, α1 is the coefficient of dummy. A potential problem to this approach is the 
limited observation when exogenous tax policy changes frequently. 
Before rounding up this section of elasticity estimation procedure, it will be worth 
remarkable that buoyancy and elasticity of tax basically looked alike. Only that 
buoyancy measures the total percentage changes in tax revenues plus the discretionary 
changes linked to a given percentage change in income while elasticity of tax 
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measures the automatic change without considering the discretionary impact. Thus the 
major differences is in the discretionary changes while tax to tax compares’ measures 
shed light on which tax underwent more discretionary changes. 
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CHAPTER 6 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 6.0: DATA CONSTRAINTS 
    The data on Gross domestic product (GDP) current market prices, final consumer 
expenditure,(private) and total domestic imports used as proxy bases for the sales 
tax/VAT and custom duties, inflation, were obtained from World Bank development 
indicator/statistics of the IMF. The data on sales/VAT, and custom revenues’ were not 
available from this source, so the data on this specific indirect taxes component were 
obtained from the department of taxes of the ministry economic and finance from the 
central bureau of national statistics in Yaoundé-Cameroon.  
   Despite the plausible methods of measuring and estimating the impact of the tax 
reforms analyzed in the preceding chapter of this paper, the paucity of the required 
data greatly restricts the different model worth applicable. The non availability of data 
on discretionary tax policies as well as other changes in the tax policy severely limits 
the possibility of explicitly distinguishing between the automatic (in-built response of 
tax revenue growth) and discretionary tax policies. Consequently, the study could not 
employ the various measures of productivity (yield of the tax system) analyzed in 
chapter 5 like that of Prest (1962) and Mansfield (1972). However in Cameroon, the 
1994 and 1999 tax reforms are considered as the main tax reforms. This study 
therefore proceed to measure and quantify the  effects of the tax reforms on the two 
indirect tax  samples using  Dummy Variable Techniques (DVT) of Singer (1968). 
This was also adopted and used by Ariyo and Chipeta in 1997 and 1998 works.  
Hence, an estimation of the individual indirect tax elasticity. Mindful of the fact that 
the growth in tax revenues in a country is not only influenced by, the responsiveness 
of the tax elasticity to it’s base and proxy bases, but by other exogenous factors,  the 
work employs another new technique of capturing these exogenous effects on tax 
revenue growth. The residuals estimated from each of the regressions used to estimate 
the elasticity of the tax, review the variability of the indirect tax revenues raising and 
thus a survey of the level of distortions of the taxes due to reforms are deduced. 
 
6.1: RESEARCH DESIGN 
To measure and quantify the effects of the two major tax reforms in Cameroon, a 
limited time series data from 1980- 2003 was used. This is because time series data on 
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tax revenue for an extended duration was hard to come by.  The scope of the analysis 
was restricted only to indirect tax reforms, within which two indirect taxes were used 
as samples. These include sales/VAT taxes (STV) from domestic strand and the 
custom duty or imports tax (CTM) from the international taxes. A disaggregated data 
for the two samples is used due to incomplete data availability on total tax revenue 
and other indirect and direct tax components.  Both taxes use the GDP or income as 
the main tax base, while the specific (proxy) base for the sales/VAT taxes is the 
private final consumption expenditure (PFCE) and for the custom duty is the total 
domestic import of goods and services (TMGS). 
The analysis is arranged to further highlight development during each of the following 
periods. 
 1980-2003 for the general productivity or the overall trends analysis. 
 1980-1993 vs 1994-2003 with the introduction of (0,1) dummy variable 
respectively to separate the pre and post 1994 tax reform impact on tax bases used 
in the analysis. 
 1994-1998 vs 1999-2003 also with the use of (0, 1) dummy for 1999 tax reform, 
to identify how the VAT implementation in 1999 affected the tax revenue 
mobilization in Cameroon. 
Considering the above analysis and data in hand, the following regressions equations 
were estimated using EVIEW and STATA as the main statistical software’s. 
EQUATIONS: 
Log STV=a0 +a1log GDP +εt……………………………………………................12 
Log STV= a0 +a1log PFCE+ εt…………………………………………………….13 
Log CTM=b0 +b1 logGDP+ εt……………………………………….....................14 
Log CTM=b0 +b1 logTMGS + εt…..........................................................................15 
 
The STV and CTM are the dependent variables and GDP, PFCE and TMGS were 
the respective regressors.  The coefficients of the results for equations 12 to 15 are the 
Buoyancy (elasticity) coefficients given that the effects of tax reforms on revenues are 
not yet considered.  See table 3a and 3b for the case of VAT below on section 6.2 
When I introduced the dummy variable to capture the effects of the tax reforms, not 
only will the tax function (intercept) change but also the slope will likely change as 
well (Verbeek, 2004, Kennedy 2003, and Ariyo, 1997).  The slope of dummy 
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equations had been employed into this analysis. This is because I had a strong 
conviction that similar adjustment would have occurred in Cameroon when they 
implemented their tax reforms of 1994 and 1999.  
The slope equations used to demonstrate the shift (intercept) and slope dummy 
functions due to the 1994 indirect tax reforms for the two sample taxes used in the 
analysis are as follow. 
Log STV=a0 +a1DUM1+ a2log GDP+ a3z1 +εt …………………………………..16 
Log STV=b0 +b1DUM1+ b2log PFCE+b3z2 +εt ………………………………….17 
Log CTM=c0  +c1DUM1+ c2 logGDP+c3 q1  εt……………………………….....18 
Log CTM=d0  + d1DUM1 + d 2 log TMGS + d3q2 ..................................................19                           
   
Where the shift (intercept) dummy variable function is represented by DUM1 which 
take values (0,1) with 0 before 1994 and 1 otherwise. To derive the slope dummy 
function I introduce a second dummies sets (interaction terms) as z1, z2, and q1, q2 for 
STV and CTM for the respective sample, which constitutes the product of DUM1 and 
the explanatory variables. For instance: Z1=Q1=DUM1 x logGDP, Z2=dum1 x 
logPFCE, q2=DUM1x logTMGS 
Hence, in the final analysis equations 12 to 15 were used for None dummies   and 
equations 16 to 19  used for the dummy base scenarios, which  appear to be consistent 
with the logarithmic autoregressive model  suggested by Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981) 
as reviewed by Ariyo (1997).  
As regard  the coefficients, in equation 16; a0=pre-reform constant, a2= Pre-reform 
STV-tax elasticity, while a1 and a3 are the post-reform or the shift of the constant and 
the elasticity of the STV tax respectively for the 1994 tax reform in Cameroon. 
Similar logically coefficients interpretations are applied to equations 17, 18 and 19. 
Thus the indirect tax revenue from STV before 1994 tax reform derived from equation 
16 will be given by 
STV REV. = a0+ a2log GDP,    
And that after the 1994 tax- reform will be obtained as  
STV REV. = a0 + a1 + (a2 + a3) log GDP, similar regression result can be done for the 
other equations to determine the tax revenue raised due to reforms if the said 
coefficients could be determined before hand. 
 The results of the regressions equations 16 to 19 are presented on table 4a below. 
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Similar analysis was done for VAT tax, to observe the effects of 1999 tax reform on 
the respective tax bases and the response of the VAT in raising revenue in Cameroon 
after it implementation, VAT was considered as a money machine (Keen, 2007). In 
this case I introduce another dummy variable (DUM2) with value 0 before 1999 and 1 
from 1999. In the same manner Z3 and Z4 are the product of DUM2 and the 
explanatory variables which correspond to LogGDP and LogPFCE used as bases. The 
two last slope dummy equations used are; 
 LogSTV= e0+ e1DUM2 + e2logGDP + e3 Z3 + εt …................................................20 
LogSTV=f0 +f1DUM2 + f2logPFCE + f3 Z4 + εt........................................................21 
 Where STV=VAT, Z3=DUM2 x LOGGDP, Z4=DUM2 x LOGPFCE. 
In same manner e0 and f0 are the pre-1999 tax -reform constant, e2 and f2 are the pre 
1999 tax reform elasticity for VAT, e1and f1 are the shift in constant term after the 
1999 reform while e3 and f3 are the post or shift of VAT elasticity after the 1999 tax 
reform. These regression results are presented on table 4b below. 
 
6.2: PRESENTATION OF REGRESSIONS RESULT. 
Table 3a shows the derived buoyancy coefficient (Elasticity coefficient) for the 
sales/VAT and custom duty taxes over the period 1980-2003 in Cameroon. Obtained 
from, the regressions result of equations 12 to 15. The F-values are significant at 
90%and 95% confidence level. The adjusted coefficient of determination (R2 ) show a 
good fit of the data where the explanatory variable adequately explain the pattern of 
behaviors of the dependence variables, except for equation 15 where the value of R2 is 
below 50%. There is also a high elasticity index of the two tax sources relative to their 
respective tax bases. For example column 3 of the table indicates high elasticity 
(buoyancy) coefficients for sales/VAT tax of above 2% while that of custom duty to 
GDP is slightly of unit elasticity and 1.5 for the total import of goods and services. 
The coefficients for both indirect tax samples below are significant at 95% confidence 
level. 
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TABLE 3a: REGRESSION RESULT OF TAX BUOYANCY COEFFICIENTS 
EQNS CONSTANT REGRESSORS ELASTITICTY
(BUOYANCY) 
COEFFICIENT
 
F-
STAT
R2 DW SER  
12 -18.43 *  
(3.385) 
GDP 2.69 *  
(0.4091) 
43.44 0.71 0.6629 0.5202  
13 -15.65 *  
(2.793)  
PFCE 2.430 *  
(0.3473) 
48.93 0.73 0.6475 0.4983  
14 -3.562** 
(1.738) 
GDP 1.023* 
(0.2087) 
12.08 0.55 o.5644 0.357  
15 -5.751* 
(2.971) 
TMGS 1.529* 
(0.4251) 
12.93 0.41 0.4227 0.3575  
 NB: *=5% level of significance, **=10% Level of significance.  
The values in the parenthesis are the standard error of the regression 
 
Similarly the next attached table 3b, presents the result of VAT from 1995 to 2003, 
when VAT was used in the country. The result is simply a replicate of the regression 
result of equation 12 and 13 except that only STV tax revenue is replaced by VAT 
revenue and the change in time period. The elasticity indices are below unity or 
inelastic to respective bases used and well justified by high value of R2 above 0.90 
and also highly significance at 95% level. This implies the VAT tax is not buoyant. 
Table: 3b: REGRESSION RESULT OF VAT TAX BUOYANCY 
COEFFICIENTS. 
Eqns constant Elasticity 
Coeff. 
F- stat R2 DW SER  
 4.303* 
(0.0895) 
0.112** 
(.0102) 
48.04 0.99 2.841 0.002  
 3.431* 
(0,584) 
0.2155** 
(0.0681) 
10.019 0.90 2.975 0.0066  
NB; *=5%level of significance, **=10% level of significance, the standard errors are 
in the parenthesis. 
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The next two tables 4a and 4b adjust the effect of the 1994 and 1999 tax reforms 
respectively. The response of the tax reform is indicated here by using the slope 
dummy functions, based on equations 16- 21 above. The first column of the table 
indicates the respective equations used from which the dependent and the independent 
variables can be referred. For instance equation 16 and 17 dependent variable is the 
sales/VAT tax and the GDP and PFCE are the respective regressors, equation 17 and 
18 have import tax as the dependent variable and the GDP and TMGS as the 
respective regressors and from  equations 20 and 21 VAT is consider as the regresand 
wile GDP and  PFCE are the respective  regressors.  Column 2 and 3 are the values of 
the constant and the elasticity coefficient before the 1994 tax reform (table 4a). 
Column 4 is the shift of the intercept (constant) after the reforms. Column 5 is the 
shift in the elasticity of the tax after the reform. Then follow the F- statistics value, 
and the column of adjusted R- square show good fit of the results with high 
coefficient of determination of above 0.75 on average. 
 
TABLE 4A:1994 TAX REFORM OF SALES/VAT AND CUSTOM DUTY TAX 
ELASTICITY RESPONSE (YIELD) FROM 1980-2003 IN CAMEROON. 
Eqns Pre-
reform 
constant 
Pre- reform 
Elasticity 
coefficients 
Shift of 
constant 
Shift in 
elasticity
F-
Statistics
R2 
 
DW SER 
16      -1.332ns 
(1.619) 
O.553* 
(0.199) 
-3.474n 
(2.273) 
0.592* 
(2.273) 
395.05 0.98 1.6917 0.118 
17 -
0.211** 
(1.300) 
0.428* 
(0.166) 
-.456* 
(1.967) 
0.739* 
(0.2439 
428.6 0.98 1.637 0.113 
18 4.75ns 
(3.075) 
-0.012ns 
(0.379) 
0.376** 
(0.185) 
0.068* 
(.0027) 
14.24 0.70 .0459 0.279 
19 0.562ns 
(2.995) 
0.592Ns 
(0.433) 
0.367* 
(0.144) 
0.0526ns 
(0.0309) 
12.86 0.69 0.434 0.2710
         
NB;*=5%level of significance,**=10% level of significance, ns=not significance 
Standard errors are in the parenthesis 
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TABLE: 4b… 1999 INDIRECT TAX REFORM (VAT ) AND YIELD IN 
CAMEROON. 
Eqns Pre-
reform 
Constant  
Pre-reform 
Elasticity  
coefficient 
Post 
reform 
constant 
shift 
Shift in 
elasticity
 
F-
STAT 
R2 
 
DW SER 
20 -3.024ns 
(3.335) 
0.9291** 
(0.3973) 
7.327ns 
(6.817) 
-.817ns 
(0.787) 
10.86 0.89 1.805 0.1337 
21 -2.751ns 
(3.460) 
0.919** 
(0.4226) 
6.182ns 
(12.720)
-.704ns 
(1.488) 
9.90 0.88 1.88 0.139 
         
NB;*=5%level of significance,**=10% level of significance, ns=not significance 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
The next two tables, table 5a and 5b are the computed total respond of the intercept 
and the slope coefficients (elasticities) of the two respective tax reforms sum by the 
researcher. This had been done for all the samples taxes in respect to the income base 
and the proxy base as seen below. 
 
TABLE 5a: TOTAL ELASTICITY SUM COEFFICIENT AFTER THE 1994 TAX 
REFORM (INDIRECT) -CAMEROON 
TYPE OF 
TAX 
BASE(PROX
Y)  
Total Intercept Total Elasticity 
coefficient 
ADJUSTED R2 
SALES 
TAX 
 GDP -04.806 1.145 .98 
 
    “ PFCE -0.667 1.167 .98 
CUSTOM 
DUTY TAX 
GDP 5.126 0.056 .70 
   “ TMGS 0.929 0.644 .69 
     
Source; computed by the author 
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TABLE 5b: TOTAL ELASTICITY OF VAT AFTER 1999 INDIRECT TAX 
REFORM IN CAMEROON. 
TYPE OF 
TAX 
BASE INTERCEPT  ELASTICITY 
COEFFICIENTS
ADJUSTED 
R2 
VAT GDP 10.351 0.1121 0.89 
VAT PFCE 3.431 0.215 0.88 
Source: computed by the author. 
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CHAPTER 7 
                     ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS  
  
7.1:  THE IMPACT OF 1994 TAX REFORM IN CAMEROON (1980-2003). 
First I was interested to know if the tax reforms in Cameroon in 1994 had any impact 
on the sales/VAT tax and the custom duty tax on revenue mobilization in general with 
respect to changes in their bases. So I did a test of coefficient of the dummy for the 
constant term and that of product of the explanatory variables (shift) for regressions 
equations 16 -19.  That is I test for the equality of the shift of the constant term and 
shift in the elasticity after the reform. For instance in equation 16, I tested if the 
coefficients a1=a3=0, b1= b3=0 for equation 17 and similar tests were performed for 
equation 18 and 19, though in equations 19 both coefficients of the shift in constant 
and elasticity were not statistically significance, the result of the tests were all 
significantly different from zero at 5 % and 10% level of significant. This compelled 
me to reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative that tax reform of 1994 
created an impact on the both indirect tax sample used in this study with  respect to 
the intercept and slope (elasticity) and consequently, on their overall revenue 
mobilization capability. The magnitude of the impact on each individual indirect tax 
forms varies.. This variation depends on the bases of each tax .Hence the response  of 
sales tax   and custom duty tax to the 1994 tax reform  were henceforth  determined as 
indicated below. 
The result shows that the sales /VAT (STV) taxes recorded a very small  increase in 
slope (elasticity) of 0.039 to GDP and 0.311 to proxy base (PFCE), while the intercept 
shifted  or decreased by 0.22 to GDP and 0.245 for proxy base.( The change in the 
intercepts and slopes result are shown on table 4a equations 16 and 17) This result 
need to be interpreted with care because a negative change of the intercept implies 
there was no autonomous income benefit from the tax reforms while the increase in 
slope of 3.9% relative to GDP, after the tax reform in Cameroon of 1994,meant that a 
1% change in GDP causes the STV to respond by a 3.9% increase in revenue from 
income. This implies the slope of the STV tax become more elastic (steeper). 
Consequently, indicating that the increase in revenue raising in Cameroon after the 
1994 tax reform was due more to increase in rates of the tax in question than by the 
expansion of the base (GDP). Similarly for the change of 0.311 on the proxy 
base(PFCE) means that a 1% change in PFCE  result to 31.1% increase in STV tax 
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revenue raising in Cameroon after the 1994 reform on this strand of indirect tax. 
These imply the slope of proxy base become steeper (inelastic).  Thus the increase in 
revenue from PFCE was more from high tax rates than the true expansion of the proxy 
base. However, the PFCE is a more efficient source of revenue mobilization than the 
GDP comparatively. This is probably because it is not easy to evade this expenditure 
tax payment by consumers at the final stage in their consumption expenditure. 
As regards the custom duty response to the 1994 tax reform, the result shows a 
decline in intercept of both tax bases by 0.19 for TMGS, and 4.37 of GDP. The 
decline in intercepts of the custom duty tax suggests that there were more autonomous 
revenue leakages from the overall country’s GDP than from the TMGS. The impact of 
custom duty tax with an increase in the elasticity from -0.012 to 0.068 in table 4a 
indicates an insignificant (small) improvement of 0.056 with respect to the GDP. This 
makes the CTM to become slightly elastic and the base tending to inelastic response. 
Comparing the 5.6% response of custom duty to 3.9% response to STV tax goes to re-
iterate the importance of custom duty as a major source of tax revenue in Cameroon. 
But on the contrary the response of the custom duty to it proxy base (TMGS) in term 
of slope shift also indicates a decline, of approximate 0.54 (the difference between 
column 3 and 5 of table 4a equation 19). This implies the slope of custom duty tax on 
TMGS further flattened or become less steep (elastic) indicating the reduction on 
imports tax rate after 1994 reform. The implied consequence is that the 1994 tax 
reform successfully controls the impact of rising prices due to the devaluation that 
took place before the tax reform implementation in 1994. The intuition behind this 
result is the expansion or increase in the base of TMGS. The increase in the base of 
this tax proxy base can be explained by a number of reasons; first is the importance of 
the high need on imports of goods and services especially manufacture imports for our 
industries, the spectacular elimination of exemptions and the slight improvement in 
the efficiency of the tax administration. 
     In spite of the few discrepancies; the overall impact of the 1994 tax reforms is a 
positive increase in revenue growth in Cameroon. See table 7 and 8 of tax revenue 
evolution in the appendix.  However, the result may not be conclusively tied to the 
1994 tax reform alone, considering that other adjustment policies like the SAP, 
devaluation, would have also affected the revenue growth in the country. The effects 
of such parameters have not been investigated in this work and are therefore 
recommended for further research 
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7.2: IMPACT OF 1999 TAX REFORM 
In order to assess the effects of the 1999 tax reform ,  similar tests of the equality of 
the  post constant and the elasticity coefficients  of equations 20 and 21 of table 4b 
were performed. That is the equality of e1= e3 =0   and f1= f3=0, in the two respective 
regression results. Though some of the post coefficients on table 4b were not 
statistically significant, but the test result shows that there were all significantly 
different from zero. This lead to the rejections of the null hypothesis at 10% level of 
significance, indicating that the 1999 tax reform in Cameroon did not go without an 
impact on the revenue raising ability. The estimated response of VAT to the reforms 
show that the intercept for both bases increases or remain highly positive, see table 5b 
for the change in intercepts. This implies that there was some significant autonomous 
Revenue increase due to VAT reforms from other sources, other than from GDP and 
PFCE. This may constitute other VAT revenue on imports which do not constitute 
parts of the VAT bases. With regards to slopes (elasticity) of VAT changes, the 
insignificance shift of negative 0.817 and 0.704 for GDP and PFCE respectively 
imply there was little or no change in elasticity of VAT after the 1999 reform. 
 This insensitive response of the slope (elasticity)  of VAT  is just an indication that 
the pure uniform VAT of 18.7% require some time lagged before it effective response. 
This short run effect of welfare reduction will likely adjust in the long run. Thus in the 
long run, informal activity will be captured by VAT, an advantage of VAT to 
developing countries pointed by Keen, (2007). This result of VAT is in agreement 
with the work of Emini,(2000) which concluded that if the VAT implemented in 
Cameroon was a pure one, then the short run worsening situation or no improvement 
in welfare will turn to a long run  benefit.  The high value of the adjusted R- square of 
above 0.88 is a good fit of the result of this analysis. If setting of a uniform VAT of 
18.7% in Cameroon recorded little or no change on it slope (elasticity) relative to it 
bases, it implies the tax would likely have an  improve  future performance. Some 
reasons for the slow response of the VAT may include:, resistance of informal sector 
activities to comply to VAT at the initial stage,  the inefficiency of the domestic tax 
department charge with the collections, high rate of poverty and corrupt nature of the 
tax official, as well as the difficulties in establishing a tax payer registration system. 
These reasons could have undermined the 1999 tax reform, for a smooth functioning 
of VAT in Cameroon.  
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NB. The table of the tax revenue evolution in Cameroon from 1992 to 2001 on 
appendix section of this work will also shed more light on the pattern of the result. 
 
 
7.3: ANALYSIS OF TAX BUOYANCY AND ELASTICITY 
The purpose of analyzing the elasticity and buoyancy of the indirect tax system for 
Cameroon in this section, which tally up with objectives no 3 of this study is simply to 
identify the total response of each indirect tax samples. The reason is to know which 
indirect taxes becomes more response (elastic) and which one remain rigid after the 
country’s major tax reform. The implication of this is to help future tax design policy 
maker to know which taxes need to be changed to become more elastic for the 
country’s future revenue raising. The analysis will further review to us which 
individual indirect taxes hurdles responses to revenues increases are links to 
discretionary influences than through natural response of the tax elasticity. Finally the 
efficiency of the tax administration can be deduced from the decomposition of the tax 
elasticity.   
 
A) TAX BUOYANCY.  
The buoyancy of the individual indirect tax for the study period 1980-2003 can be 
found in table 3a and 3b. This was estimated by the regressions of equations 12 -15. 
The values of adjusted R- square portray a good fit of the data on revenue and income. 
The sales /VAT taxes is highly buoyant with a coefficient of above 2 for both GDP 
and the proxy base. This is because of upward adjustment of its rates during tax 
reform and also due to the difficulties of evading and avoiding such an indirect tax.  
The custom duty taxes were also buoyant but their buoyancy index is far lesser to 
those of sales tax. The buoyancy of custom duty relative to GDP was almost unity. 
This is probably due to reduction of taxes in imports duty to encourage 
competitiveness of the home investment. Tax evasion, exemption, corrupt tax 
administration and the presents of second economy which facilitated tax evasion in 
Cameroon may as well be responsible for the existing tax buoyancy. The same 
obvious reason may also explain the non buoyant structure of the VAT tax revenue as 
illustrated in figure 3b. 
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B) ANALYSIS OF TAX ELASTICITY 
The elasticity coefficients for sales tax and the custom duty for the period before the 
tax reforms shown on table 4a and 4b of column3, indicates that the main indirect tax 
components in Cameroon under this study were all income inelastic, signified the 
narrow base of the tax system. This result is a good fit of the data as justified by the 
high value of R-square. 
After the consecutive tax reforms, the combine elasticity illustrated on table 5a and 
5b show that only the sales tax become income elastic. The custom duty tax 
persistently remains income inelastic relative to its both bases. The reason for this 
change may be due to possible improvement in tax administration, and also based on 
the fact that such indirect taxes on good and services are some how difficult to evade. 
The explanation of inelasticity of the custom tax are the numerous exemption schemes 
for some imports category, custom fraud, inefficiency of the custom administration 
and other forms of illegal importation and above all the low  level of investment and 
manufacture could also account for the low imports tax elasticity.  
The most interesting result of the elasticity change is that of VAT, though it remains 
inelastic but have exhibit some level of stability in its elasticity response to its bases, 
in spite the it new uniform set rate of 18.7%.  Thus it is promissory tax with 
possibility to broadened, consequently can generate more revenue for the country. It 
slow response in the short period may be difficult  justifying, perhaps the inadequate 
data or the time frame is too short to give a concise assessment of the yield of this tax 
structure in this analysis, otherwise there might have been increase practice of VAT 
fraud mechanism and the initial resistance by the growing informal activities to the 
tax.  
Generally the result of elasticity as indicated on table 5a and 5b,shows that over the 
study period  the sales/VAT tax elasticity increased but the intercept declined  while 
for custom duty, intercept increased  and elasticity relative to income decline(inelastic) 
but  increase relative to GDP and dropped in case of  it proxy base. 
 
C): DECOMPOSITION OF ELASTICITY 
However the elasticity of any tax consist of 2 elements the base (tax to base elasticity) 
and base to income (base to income elasticity). The income elasticity of a given tax is 
the product of the two as indicated by equation 4 of chapter 5. Given the difficulties of 
determining the legal base of a tax, the yield of the two indirect tax samples used in 
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this analysis has been related to an approximate or proxy base which I later relate it to 
the GDP. This decomposition relation is indicated on table 6 below. 
SALES/VAT TAX: The sales tax or the turnover tax was the main domestic indirect 
tax in Cameroon. After 1994 reform it operates together with the quasi value added 
tax, but was fully replaced by VAT. VAT is a tax on various stages of production 
process exclude taxes on intermediary product, thus a  reclaim of VAT on input, It is  
certain that the final burden of the tax is on consumer, consequently I used the private 
final consumption expenditure as my proxy base for this tax component. 
IMPORT OR CUSTOM DUTY TAX: This tax constitutes the main source of 
revenue in Cameroon from international taxes. The tax is generally imposed on 
imports (CIF) other than those legally exempted or zero rated. Thus this research used 
the total domestic imports of goods and services (TMGS) as the proxy base for this 
indirect tax strand. 
 
 
TABLE 6: DECOMPOSITION OF TAX ELASTICITY’S 1980-2003. 
 
        Tax to income   Proxy base to  Proxy base to 
        Elasticity   Tax elasticity  income elasticity 
Tax related 
proxy base 
coefficient R2  coefficient R2 Coefficient R2 
SALES/VAT 1.15 0.98 0.89 0.81 1.167 0.98 
CUSTOM 
DUTY 
0.059 0.65 0.15 0.34 0,643 0.64 
 
With regard to sales/VAT taxes   a positive coefficient of income elasticity indicates 
some slight increase in production activity at home relative to GDP, but the inelastic 
proxy base (0.89) implies a low growth of this tax base. However the 1.167 tax to 
proxy base signified some improvement of the domestic tax department 
administration in the country. The high value of R- square for the 3 coefficients 
indicates goods fit of the data and the result. 
 Custom duty tax, showed a tax to income elasticity of 0.059 (inelastic). The proxy 
base to income and the tax to proxy base are very low for import duty, implying a 
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slow growth of dutiable imports and the inefficiency of the custom administration 
respectively. The fairly low R- square for the 3 coefficients in table 6 indicates a weak 
relationship between custom revenue collection, tax and imports.  
In the final analysis the proxy base to income elasticity for both taxes had been fairly 
low or inelastic relative to GDP. This can be increased by expanding domestic 
production scale and increase demand for import and why not a possible reduction of 
the tax rates of this specific indirect tax. 
  
D) BUOYANCY AND ELASTICITY FOR CAMEROON INDIRECT TAX 
SYSTEM. 
        Through out the analysis of this model, the buoyancy had generally dominated 
the elasticity. The difference had been quite large for both bases for the two samples 
of indirect tax, the corresponding constant value moving in opposite direction. An 
indication that discretionary tax, policy is more effective to raise tax revenue.  
 
7.4): EFFECTS OF TAX REFORMS ON THE OVERALL ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITIES IN CAMEROON -1980-2003. 
Consider the time constraints and the unavailability of detail data on some 
micro/macro variables in Cameroon. Effects of tax reforms on economic activities 
could not be quantified. The researcher has therefore adopted different techniques, 
which capture the pattern of economic performance due to tax reform. Under these 
circumstances I estimated the residual from each tax revenue regression determined 
by the changes in GDP and proxy base and graph them. This gives an overall trend 
survey of the country’s economic performance due to tax reforms. The logical 
reasoning behind this approach is that the tax revenue collection varies directly with 
the type of shocks that hit the economy. A negative shock is an indication of decline 
in tax revenue which goes in accordance to the overall economic activities. The graph 
of the estimated residual of sales/VAT and custom duty tax below, clearly illustrate 
the movement of the country’s overall economic activities over the reform period. 
This may serve as a non quantifiable method of surveying the impact of tax reform on 
productive activities of an economy. This will however depend on a number of 
assumptions. 
-the country tax system is not characterized with tax evaders and no tax fraud. 
- The tax administration must be good and efficient. 
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- Should be a complete absence of underground or informal economy that tends to 
undermine tax revenue collection. 
Fig. 4 
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Source: (My graph). 
RESIDUAL ESTIMATES OF SALES/VAT TAX TO GDP CHANGES FROM 
1980-2003. CAMEROON  
 As shown on the plot of sales/VAT  residual before 1984/85, positive shocks from oil 
sector and agricultural sector generated increase tax revenue from this source, but 
later on negative shock from the economic crisis affected tax revenue, where general 
economic activity were declining,. The interesting view of this is that as tax reform 
came in 1994, which cumulated to some positive shock on the tax system. There was 
an increase in growth rate and general economic performance till the year 2001.. 
similar pattern of trend of economic activities  can also be explain by the alternating 
shocks that hit the custom tax system as illustrated below on fig.5 below for 
Cameroon from 1980-2002. 
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Fig.5 RESIDUAL ESTIMATES OF CUSTOM DUTY TAX REVENUE TO 
CHANGES IN GDP-1980-2003- CAMEROON 
Source: by the researcher. 
  The above explanation does not, however, indicates the effective distortion caused 
by the tax reforms, thus consider in particular custom duty tax on imports. The 
impositions of an additional tax on this tax base create a distortion in the form of lost 
of welfare or a complete reduction in total imports volume, though, government 
revenue has increased in general. It is better for the government to reduce the rates of 
these taxes so as to minimize the distortions and by so doing will further increase the 
tax base. Thus lower tax rates are more preferable than higher tax rate since they 
cause very limited distortion on economic activities. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The research focused on the link between tax reforms and revenue mobilization, 
wherein attempts were made to assess the impact and the influence of the 1994 and 
1999 indirect tax reforms on tax revenue raising in Cameroon.   
The initial tax system and the obvious cause of tax revenue fluctuation in the 
economy were reviewed, alongside the role and importance of tax reforms in revenue 
mobilization in other developing countries. Detailed analysis of the proper indirect tax 
reforms in Cameroon were ensured, estimating and quantifying the tax reform through 
estimates of the intercepts and elasticity from a series of regression analysis.  
The null hypothesis that the tax reforms in Cameroon had no impact on revenue 
mobilization were rejected in favour of the alternatives; implying that the 1994 and 
1999 indirect tax reforms had an influence on revenue mobilization in the country. 
However the impact of the indirect tax reforms varies according to different 
components. It could be realized that the extent of the impact (response) depended on 
the specific individual indirect tax hurdles and the respective bases. 
. The impact of the 1994 tax reform on the two samples indirect taxes that is the 
sales/VAT tax (STV) and custom duty tax (CTM) in respect to their tax bases 
indicates the following results; 
At the intercept the STV recorded a negative drop of 22% and 24.5% for it two 
respective tax bases, which are the GDP and the private final consumption 
expenditure (PFCE). The response of the elasticity (slope) resulted to an upward shift 
of 0.039 for GDP and 0.311 for PFCE which signified an elastic response (high tax 
rates) in tax revenue raising. 
Similarly the CTM response to the tax reform shows a decline at the intercept of 19% 
and 43% for it tax bases which are the GDP and the total imports of goods and 
services (TMGS). The impact of CTM on the slope showed a positive or upward shift 
of 0.056 on  the slope with respect to the GDP (elastic response) but a downward 
(negative) shift of 0.54  in respect to the proxy base (TMGS) corresponding to an 
inelastic response of the tax. 
The stated results of the STV and CTM relatives to their tax bases due from the 1994 
tax reform in Cameroon can be given the following interpretations. 
 55
The experience decrease in the intercept (constant term) of STV, implies an 
autonomous leakage in tax revenues for STV from it respective tax bases of 22% and 
24.5%. The increase /upward shift of the slope of STV resulted to increase in it tax 
revenue by 3.9% from changes in GDP and 31% from PFCE This generated more 
revenue, but which was only in the short term because of the contraction or inelastic 
response of the tax sources (bases). 
 The CTM intercept decline for the overall GDP and on the TMGS implies there was 
no autonomous revenue increase from the tax sources rather there was a leakage of 
19% and 43% out of CTM respective tax bases.  As regard to the slope the indicated 
result of an upward shift in the slope by 0.056 of GDP means the CTM tax revenue 
increase by 5.6% from this base. However the contradicting decline or downward 
shift in the slope of the CTM tax in respect to TMGS showing an inelastic response 
has a negative impact that resulted to 54% decline of this tax revenue. This decrease 
in CTM tax revenue due to the reduction of the tax rate by tax reform was only a short 
run effects intended to counter the effect of rising prices on imported goods caused by 
the devaluation of the country’s currency in 1994. This was an efficient policy 
because in the long run the bases of CTM broaden with a positive response to tax 
revenue yields.    
 The impact of the  1999 tax reform that completely replaced consumption taxes by 
uniform Value Added Tax (VAT) of 18.7%  show a positive shift in the intercept of 
VAT by 10.35% and 3.43%  in respect to GDP and PFCE as tax  bases. The elasticity 
response (slope) was not significant. The implied result of the intercept shows that 
there was an autonomous revenue realised. This could possibly be due to the ability of 
the VAT to capture other activities out of it specify tax base. The little or no change in 
the elasticity inspite the step up VAT rate by 18.7%, indicates the insensitivity of the 
VAT the 1999 reform in the short run. This deserves some particular attention by the 
state. 
A comparative analysis of the different indirect tax hurdles showed that CTM become 
more responsive to revenue yield than STV in the post 1994 reform period. VAT 
remains rigid to revenue mobilisation after the 1999 tax reform. 
    Other findings of the research from the analysis of elasticity and buoyancy with 
regards to the third objective proved that before tax reforms in Cameroon; both 
indirect tax samples had an inelastic response to changes in their bases, while the post 
reforms, result of the sales /VAT tax became more responsive (elastic) and the 
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customs duty remained inelastic. Again there were signs of dominant use of discretion 
in mobilising revenue than through in-built response of the elasticity. 
     As regard the question of level of distortion of tax reforms in Cameroon, though 
not one of main objectives of this study an overall survey of the analysis was done, 
the results show that the shocks that affect tax revenue collection tend to determine 
the trend of the economic activities in the country. This study strongly recommends 
future research to a deeper finding of how the tax reforms in Cameroon affected the 
efficiency of the overall economic activities.  
      Finally, conceivable policy implication of the above results is that though there 
was a stable revenue mobilisation after the 1999 tax reform, but in general there was 
an overall increase in the country’s revenue especially after the 1994 tax reforms but 
the system is still characterised with lot of revenue leakages which need to be checked 
and controlled. The inelastic response of the indirect tax bases is also an issue for  
policy maker to address.. There is need to tend the country tax bases to be more 
responsive (elastic) in order to guarantee a sustainable future revenue growth. Lastly a 
tax system with regular use of discretion may not be a credible environment to 
investment. 
     Consequently few recommendations had been suggested below as a possible 
remedy to tax revenue mobilisation process in Cameroon..   
Recommendation 
        -First, there is the need to perform this analysis in larger scales in order to have a 
response of the different taxes for the entire country for better tax policy design for 
Cameroon. This will require the need to improve the tax data collection system for the 
country.  
        -Secondly, the need to broaden the country’s tax bases through a reduction in tax 
rates, tightening of revenue leakages through continuous improvements of the 
efficiency of the tax administration, fight against tax fraud, evasion through mass 
education of the tax payer, and computerization of the various tax bases. 
 
                                                
 
 
 
 
 57
 REFERENCES 
 
Amin, A. A. (2002): “An Examination of Sources of Economic Growth In Cameroon” 
             Africa Research Consortium (AERC) No: 116. 
 
Ahmad, E. and N.Stern (1991): “The Theory and Practice of Tax Reform In 
Developing  
                     Countries” Cambridge University Press  
 
Allingham, M.G. and A. Sandmo (1972): “Income Tax Evasion, a Theoretical 
Analysis”. 
                   Journal of Public Economics 1, 323-338 
Addison, T and O. Robert (2001): “Taxation And Fiscal Reform In Ghana”  
                   United Nation University, WIDER  Discussion paper No 2001/97. 
 
Ariyo, A. (1997): “Productivity of the Nigerian Tax System” 
                        AERC NAIROBI KENYA 
 
Chipeta, C. (1998):”Tax Reforms and Tax yield in Malawi” 
                            AERC, Research Paper 81. 
Cameroon tax code: for various year (1994, 1992, 1994 1998, and 1999 )  
                                     http://www.impots.gov.cm 
 
Fjelstad, O.H.and L.Rakner (2003): “Taxation and Tax Reforms in Developing                  
                Countries” Illustration from Sub Saharan Africa. CMI Report NO 6;  
 
Fambon, S. (2006): “Taxation in Developing Countries” Case Study of Cameroon.               
                     UNU-WIDER, Research paper no: 2 
 
Emran, M.S. and J.E Stiglitz (2002): “Selective Indirect Tax Reforms in  
              Developing Countries”. Journal of public Economic 89, 599-623 
 
 
 
 58
Emini, A.C (2000)”Long Run Vs Short Run Effects of a Value Added Tax: A    
                  Computable General Equilibrium Assessment for Cameroon” CREFA;  
                  Cahier de recherché No.00-12. 
                   http://www.crefa.ecn.ulaval.ca/cahier/0012.pdf 
 
Gauthier B, Soloaga,I and J.Tybout (2002): “A firm’s –Eye view of policy and fiscal    
                    Reforms in Cameroon” World Bank, Policy research working paper 
                            No 2442. 
                                    
Gauthier, B. and M. Gersorvitz (1993): “Revenue Erosion through Exemption and  
               Evasion in Cameroon” Journal of public Economics 64, 407-424 
 
Hindriks, J. and D.G. Myles (2005): “Intermediate Public Economics” 
                    MIT Press, London England, Cambridge, Massachusetts    
 
Johannes, A.J, A.J. Nju and A.J Afeanyi (2006): “The Distribution of Expenditure 
Tax  
                        Burden before and after Tax Reform” AERC Paper no.161 Nairobi                                      
 
Keen, M.(2007) “VAT attacks”  Journal of International tax public finance 14 , 
                                   365-381 
KENNEDY, P. (2003) “A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRIC” Blackwell publisher, 
Replica 
                           Press India. 
 
Larvin, J. (1968): “The Effects of Economic Development On the Basis of Sales Tax:        
ACase study of Columbia” IMF Staff paper:  Vol.XV, 30-101 
 
Loeb, I. (1900): “The German colonial fiscal system” Journal of America economic   
               Association 3 rd series.1, No 3 p 40-72 JESTOR. 
 
Muriithi, K.M and D. E. Moyi (2003): “Tax Reforms and Revenue  
                    Mobilisation in Kenya” AERC Research Paper, 131 
 
 59
Mansfield, Y.C. (1972): “Elasticity and Buoyancy of a Tax System”, 
                                  IMF, 19, Staff paper 
 
Prest, A.R. (1962):”The Sensitivity of The Yield Of Personal Income Tax in The 
United                         
                          Kingdom”   The Economic journal, LXX11, 576-596 
 
Sohota G.S.(1961):”Indian Tax Structure and Economic Development”  
                Asian publishing, house London. 
 
Singer, N.M (1968):’’The Use of Dummy Variables in Estimating Income Elasticity 
of          
          State Income Tax Revenues’’ National tax journal 21,200-204. 
 
Tanzi, V. (1994): “Taxation in an integrated world” Washington DC. 
 
Tanzi V. and Zee (2000): “Tax Policy for Emerging Markets. Developing  
            Countries” National tax Journal. 58. No 2, 299-322.  
 
Talvi, E. and C.Vegh (2005):‘’Tax Variability and Procyclical Fiscal Policy in     
                      Developing countries” Journal of Development Economics 78, 156-190.                          
 
Verbeck, M (2004) “A Guide To Modern Econometric” 2ND Edition 
                                      Wiley Home. 
 
World Bank (1994): “Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead”        
                                   Oxford University Press, New York 
 
World Bank,(1992): “Regional Cooperation for Adjustment”: A program of Trade 
and            
Indirect Tax Policy Reforms for Member countries of the Customs Union of 
             Central African States (UDEAC). Report No.9747-AFR. Washington D.C     
 
 60
World Bank,(1990):”Argentina , Tax policy for Stabilisation and Economic 
Recovery” Country study, Washington, DC, 
 
World Bank, (1995): “Republic OF Cameroon. The Challenge: Harnessing Unrealised  
                   Potential” (A private sector Assessment Report No.13955-CM,) 
                            Washington, D.C. 
 
World Bank, (1991); “Lesson of tax reform” 
                 World Bank, Washington 
  
 
 
                                           
 
 
                                                                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
 
 
 61
APPENDICES 
 
   APPENDIX A 
 
 
TABLE 7 
 
 
 
NB: The table is from the FAMBON research work on taxation in developing 
countries 
table 8 show tax revenue evolution in Cameroon from 1992- 2001 in billion of FCFA. 
NB: The table is from the FAMBON research work on taxation in developing 
countries 
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NB: The table is from the Fambon research work on taxation in developing countries      
          Showing the annual tax revenue growth  of the different taxes in Cameroon in 
percentages. 
 
TAX REVENUE GROWTH IN PERCENTAGES IN CAMEROON FROM 
1992-2001 
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APPENDIX B 
 
YEARS GDP TMGS STV CTM PFCE DUM1 DUM2 
1980 1410 1027   1104 0 0 
1981 1796 967   1426 0 0 
1982 2173 936 20 146 1530 0 0 
1983 2618 894 21 173 1907 0 0 
1984 3195 1017 23 174 2281 0 0 
1985 3839 1266 26 131 2815 0 0 
1986 4106 1221 27 107 3038 0 0 
1987 3922 1042 31 92 3099 0 0 
1988 3644 1065 23 91 2880 0 0 
1989 3513 1215 25 91 2808 0 0 
1990 3353 1094 22 90 2659 0 0 
1991 3340 957 20 89 2604 0 0 
1992 3195 857 23 78 2667 0 0 
1993 3155 758 21 69 2600 0 0 
1994 3416 789 101 105 2804 1 0 
1995 4125 1121 108 133 3319 1 0 
1996 4571 1141 100 154 3778 1 0 
1997 4932 1141 130 192 3991 1 0 
1998 5240 1006 162 212 4238 1 0 
1999 5406 1198 193 229 4986 1 1 
2000 6612 1414 197 281 5269 1 1 
2001 7061 1484 199 281 5719 1 1 
2002 7583 1489  293 6142 1 1 
2003 7917   316 6506 1 1 
        
 
GDP= Gross Domestic Product; TMGS= Total imports of goods and services. 
STV= sales tax revenue:  CTM= custom duty tax revenue: 
PFCE= private final consumption expenditure. 
APPENDIX B: Show the time series tax revenue data for STV and  CTM  for 
Cameroon from 1980-2003. 
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APPENDIX  C 
 
NB;*=5%level of significance,**=10% level of significance, ns=not significance 
 
 
 
 
Regression results of equation 16 to 21 including lagged variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression of VAT 
 
 
Eqns constant Elasticity 
Coefficient 
Lagged 
Elasticity 
Slope Shift R² 
20 -0.288ns 
(1.927) 
3.044* 
(0.57) 
-2.444* 
(0.4892) 
-1.022ns 
(6.279) 
0.163ns 
(0.716) 
0.852 
21 2.143ns 
(1.944) 
2.745* 
(0.725) 
-2.433* 
(0.656) 
-10.819ns 
(9.963) 
1.3183ns 
(1.155) 
0.787 
NB;*=5%level of significance,**=10% level of significance, ns=not significance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eqns Constant Elasticity 
Coefficient 
Lagged 
Elasticity 
Slope Shift R² 
16 5.88* 
(2.32) 
1.777* 
(0.596) 
-1.9398* 
(0.4152) 
-12.854** 
(2.745) 
1.564* 
(0.332) 
0.89 
17 9.286* 
(1.775) 
1.092** 
(0.596) 
-1.693* 
(0.4218) 
-15.951* 
(2.238) 
2.008* 
(0.278) 
0.92 
18 5.889* 
(2.323) 
1.777* 
(0.596) 
-1.939* 
(0.415) 
-12.804* 
(2.745) 
1.564* 
(0.333) 
0.91 
19 -2.643* 
(2.824) 
0.9322ns 
(0.5606) 
0.122ns 
(0.560) 
0.479* 
(0.1442) 
0.0013* 
(.0037) 
0.852 
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APPENDIX D 
 
ESTIMATED RESIDUAL  for STV  from equation 16 regression used to plot the graph of figure 4. 
 
 
 
1980 NA 
1981 NA 
1982 0.702956 
1983 0.249293 
1984 -0.196912 
1985 -0.569540 
1986 -0.713139 
1987 -0.451338 
1988 -0.551548 
1989 -0.369428 
1990 -0.371541 
1991 -0.456374 
1992 -0.196912 
1993 -0.253904 
1994 1.102332 
1995 0.660706 
1996 0.306857 
1997 0.364216 
1998 0.420905 
1999 0.511885 
2000 -0.010711 
2001 -0.177804 
2002 NA 
2003 NA 
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ESTIMATED RESIDUAL  for CTM REGRESSION OF EQUATION 18  USED IN FIGURE 4 PLOT 
1980 NA 
1981 NA 
1982 0.274125 
1983 0.514009 
1984 0.322667 
1985 -0.296063 
1986 -0.443092 
1987 -0.351732 
1988 -0.396045 
1989 -0.597528 
1990 -0.448174 
1991 -0.254770 
1992 -0.217943 
1993 -0.152847 
1994 0.205718 
1995 -0.094914 
1996 0.024650 
1997 0.245192 
1998 0.536828 
1999 0.346880 
2000 0.298042 
2001 0.224161 
2002 0.260835 
2003 NA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
